Following Up on Yesterday: Holder Memo on Appeal

I just posted this note to the 6th Cir. blog.  It dovetails nicely with our panel training yesterday.

United States v. Ivory, No. 13-5962 (6th Cir. Mar. 21, 2014) (unpublished), is a fairly unremarkable per curiam opinion (Judges Boggs, Siler, and Gibbons).

But I'm noting it here b/c the defendant relied on the Holder memo to argue for a lower sentence.  The COA rejected the argument.

Crack case.  Defendant was a career offender.  GLs 151 to 188.  D asked for a 60-month sentence (over-represented criminal history, just a street-level dealer).  Dist ct granted downward variance and sentenced D to 130 months of imprisonment. 

COA says that "[g]iven that we afford a within-guidelines sentence a rebuttable presumption of substantive reasonableness, [the defendant's] burden of demonstrating that his below-guidelines sentence 'is unreasonably long is even more demanding.'"   

COA stressed that the Holder memo on charging mand mins and recidivist enhancements is just a policy statement.  Confers no rights.  Plus, D was not subject to a mand min, was already convicted at the time, and not subject to a "recidivist enhancement" (statutory one, as he was a career offender).  Also said that he was not a candidate for the policy b/c of his lengthy criminal history.    

Sentence affirmed. 

Clemency . . . .

Yes, I just used the C word. 

It seems we may be looking at some sentence commutation.  And a group of organizations, including the Defender organization, NACDL, FAMM, and more, have formed Clemency Project 2014. 

BOP is going to be sending notice to inmates outlining the criteria for which the president is looking and telling inmates how to get assistance from the Clemency Project. 

If YOU would like to take a case, please contact Norman Reimer at clemencyproject@nacdl.org. 

The criteria IN BRIEF(!):
* Drugs (any kind).
* Would sentence be lower if imposed today?
* Long sentence, clean record in custody, not a public-safety threat, and more. . . .

Also, if you have represented someone that you think might be a candidate and want to explore the criteria and/or want to recommend them for review in this process, you can call the office at 616-742-7420 and I can send you more info.

More Blewett: Dissenting Opinions

I just posted on the 6th Cir. blog too. . . .  My week to blog there.

Judge Merritt's Blewett dissent:

* Restoring fairness and enforcing a "no-change" sentencing policy based on "finality" are incongruous.  Congress intended to remedy irrationality and disproportion.  Court is thwarting this effort. 
* Cites NACDL and NAACP amicus briefs. 
* "Practically all observers" now recognize the ills of the old system. 

Judge Cole's dissent:

* Applying 100-to-1 ratio and mandatory minimums to deny 3582(c)(2) relief violates equal-protection principles. 
* African-Americans treated more harshly than Caucasian offenders under this regime.  And  88% of the inmates that would be eligible for a reduction if mand mins not a bar are African-American. 
* Claim of "finality" cannot withstand even rational-basis scrutiny under equal-protection principles.
* "Finality " not a bar to other 3582(c)(2) resentencings.  Irrational to allow sentence to be lowered in one case and not the other. . . .
* Quotes Judge Nathaniel Jones: "As judges, we should no longer remain wedded to that which experience shows is neither rational nor fair." 

Judge Clay's dissent:

* Majority is furthering prior injustice by holding that the FSA is not retro.  Individuals like Blewetts will continue to be imprisoned "in a disproportionate, unjustified manner, in violation of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause." 
* Not sure of procedural mechanism for relief. 
* "Although the FSA is not facially discriminatory, an interpretation of the FSA foreclosing the retroactive application of its new mandatory minimums would present an equal protection problem inasmuch as it would subject a group that is overwhelmingly predominately African American to starkly different treatment under the law.  Such an interpretation can meet neither strict scrutiny nor rational basis review and should therefore be avoided by this Court."
* "Adopting new mandatory minimums for the purpose of righting the racially discriminatory wrongs of the past and not extending the benefits of the new enactment to the thousands of predominately African American individuals serving disproportionate sentences under a now-rejected statue violates equal protection because Congress has recognized and reaffirmed 'its adverse effects' upon the African American community."
* Congress has distinguished crack and powder offenders, "the former being overwhelmingly impoverished African Americans."  This group---crack offenders---is exceedingly "abject, disparaged, powerless," a minority group that may be the most powerless.  Here the democratic process "breaks down" and "traditional rational basis review is insufficient to protect the group of individuals convicted under federal crack cocaine mandatory minimums."  More than 82% of this group is African-American (2005 stat).  The courts should not defer "to government enactments under circumstances where an irrational classification based on the form of cocaine, which has real-world consequences in terms of sentencing disparities, tracks so closely with race."  No legitimate penological/pharmacological reason for the continued incarceration of inmates who were subjected to extended sentences under the repudiated 100-to-1 ratio.  In the face of a "more rigorous rational basis standard, the government can only offer finality as its legitimate interest in support of the continued application of the old mandatory minimums."  Won't cut it. 

Judge Rogers's dissent:

* Finds that "Dorsey supports the idea that, when a post-Fair Sentencing Act sentence is properly calculated under 3582(c)(2) because a guideline has been retroactively changed, the new statutory minimums should be applied as well.  In other words, when a post-Fair Sentencing Act sentencing court properly has before it the calculation of a sentence, the court should use the Fair Sentencing Act minimums."
* Majority's analysis is anomalous.
* With Dorsey in view, not logical to rely on saving statute's default rule. 
* 3582(c)(2) = Congress's "background principle of retroactivity." 
* Illogical to provide GL relief and not statutory relief. 
* Cites argument re. "worse guys" who were sentenced above GLs getting break while less culpable guys (sentenced at mand min) not getting break. 
* "It may be that the Supreme Court Justices and litigants in Dorsey assumed that the 18-1 minimums could not be applied whenever sentencing occurred prior to the Fair Sentencing Act's passage.  But assumptions are not law.  Likewise the holdings of other circuits, and of our prior three-judge panels, are not binding, however persuasive they may or may not be.  The plain fact is that the language of the Fair Sentencing Act does not require the anomaly that the 18-1 ratio applies retroactively to reduce guideline-driven sentences but not mandatory minimum-driven sentences, when both the guidelines and the minimums were reduced by the Fair Sentencing Act."
* Somewhat distinguishes the adverse law in other circuits.  (Footnote 1.)
* "This analysis does not mean that the Sentencing Commission is trumping the statute.  The revised statutory minimums are, after all, created by statute.  The Sentencing Commission, acting properly under 28 U.S.C. 994(u), made the Fair Sentencing Act-driven guidelines retroactive.  Doing so provided the statutory key to making the statutory minimum changes applicable under 3582.  This is a reasonable statutory interpretation, and it is particularly reasonable to avoid an incoherent anomaly."
* Does agree with majority that constitutional avoidance doesn't apply. 
Judge White's dissent:

* She concurs in Judge Rogers's dissent and writes "separately to express the view that the fair implication of the Fair Sentencing Act is that Congress intended that the Sentencing Commission determine whether and to what extent the newly enacted increased base-cocaine quantity thresholds for triggering mandatory minimum sentences would be applicable to defendants already under sentence.  Further, allowing application of the new 18:1 ratio to all offenders already under sentence except those whose sentences under the new ratio would clash with the old 100:1 ratio's mandatory minimum sentences bears no rational relation to any identified Congressional purpose."
* "It is the majority that turns the Fair Sentencing Act on its head by its rigid adherence to the general savings statute in the face of the Commission's clear authority to establish the new guidelines based on the greater mandatory-minimum thresholds and to decide whether and to what extent the new thresholds should be applied to prisoners under sentence."
* She addresses several arguments regarding the Commission's powers. 
* "The Blewetts's claim does not rest on an asserted constitutional right to the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act.  It rests on the irrationality of allowing its application to all sentences that have become final and are affected by the new guidelines except sentences based on the very mandatory minimum levels that the Fair Sentencing Act amended.  Congress did not intend this irrationality, and that is why Judge Rogers is correct.  Nevertheless, if Congress is understood to have the intent ascribed to it by the majority, that intent is irrational and violates the  Equal Protection Clause absent rational justification other than finality."

Blewett Decided

I just posted this note to the 6th Cir. blog too. 

Well, the Sixth Circuit en banc released Blewett yesterday.  Get out your hankies.  This one's a tear jerker.

United States v. Blewett, Nos. 12-5226/5582 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 2013).  The majority opinion is by Judge Sutton.  Judge Moore concurred.  Judges Merritt, Donald, Cole, Clay, Rogers, White, and Stranch dissented. 

The COA framed the issue: "whether the changes created by the [Fair Sentencing] Act apply to defendants sentenced five years before the new law took effect." 

Conclusion: "Consistent with a 142-year-old congressional presumption against applying reductions in criminal penalties to those already sentenced, 1 U.S.C. 109, consistent with the views of all nine Justices and all the litigants in Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2012), consistent with the decision of every other court of appeals in the country, and consistent with dozens of our own decisions, we hold that the Act does not retroactively undo final sentences.

As one defendant's custodial sentence has wrapped up and he's now on supervised release, the gov had moved the COA to dismiss his appeal as moot.  The COA found no need to address this issue, as there was no doubt about jurisdiction over at least one of the defendants in the consolidated appeal. 

*The FSA does not apply to those sentenced pre-FSA.
* 3582(c)(2) doesn't get around this prohibition.
* The Constitution can't help either. 

Points of interest:
* One can only get around 1 USC 109 if the statute expressly addresses it or clearly implies overcoming it.  Not present in FSA, which is "forward looking." 
* Distinguishes Dorsey. 
* All the federal courts of appeals have held the FSA does not apply to those sentenced before the FSA went into effect. 
* 3582(c)(2) does not help: these proceedings are not plenary resentencings. 
* Sentencing Commission has said that the amendments apply only to the GLs and do not affect statutory provisions. 
* Equal-protection and cruel-and-unusual arguments under the Constitution fail.  No racially discriminatory purpose, so disproportionate effect allowed to stand. 
* Gov "has a powerful interest in avoiding the disruption of final sentences." 
* 8th Am "is not a ratchet that makes a harsher system of penalties unconstitutional the moment a more lenient one is (prospectively) adopted."  Such a holding might actually discourage lawmakers from lowering sentences. 
* The courts simply lack the authority to lower the sentences here, even if there are policy arguments in favor of lower sentences. 
* Many believe "Congress should think seriously about making the new minimums retroactive."

Judge Moore's Concurrence:
* Agrees with majority's judgment, but has reservations. 
* Sees issues with jurisdiction (the one defendant is now on supervised release).  No "hypothetical jurisdiction" (assuming jurisdiction b/c the ct can easily boot the case on the merits).  Nevertheless, she would deny the gov's motion to dismiss.  Term of supervised release could be reduced if appeal determined favorably, so appeal not moot. 
* 1 USC 109 governs: no retroactivity. 
* Because of limits to 3582(c)(2), constitutionality of sentences not before COA, but challenge under 2255 could/should succeed.  Crack-powder disparity = racial disparity.  And no state treats crack and powder so disproportionately as the federal gov did pre-FSA, so 8th Am problem now. 

I will explore the dissent tomorrow. 

The Crack Plot Thickens

OK, yesterday, United States v. Doe was released.  No case #.  Panel of Judges Keith, Cole, and Rogers.  It's for publication and there's a concurrence by Cole and a dissent by Rogers.  The opinion is good:

 

"For the reasons stated above, we hold that applying the new [FSA crack] minimums in Defendant’s § 1B1.10(b)(1) calculation is the only way to give effect to Congress’s intent to achieve consistency with other Guidelines provisions, especially with regard to which kinds of defendants—cooperative and uncooperative—are eligible for sentence reductions."

 

Defense counsel is likely to be able to surmise why the COA redacted. 

 

The crack issues swirl on. . . .

OK, These Cases Are Just Getting Confusing

OK, X (below) was good, but same day, United States v. Joiner, No. 12--4508 (6th Cir. Aug. 20, 2013) (for publication), comes out.  Judges Boggs, McKeague, and Beckwith (S.D. Ohio).  This latter opinion comes to the opposite conclusion from that expressed in X: the new FSA mand mins do not apply. 

Also on the same day, the COA filed an opinion-correction letter in X, a letter not available to the public.  So the X opinion has been "corrected," but not publically.  And the COA has allowed an extension of time for the gov to seek rehearing in X. 

So we wait. . . .

Lightening Strikes Twice: Blewett Revived!

OK, oral argument in Blewett set for Oct. 9.  In the meantime, we have United States v. X, No. X (6th Cir. Aug. 20, 2013) (for publication).  Panel of Judges Keith, Cole, and Rogers.  Judge Keith penned the lead opinion.  Judge Cole concurred.  And Judge Rogers dissented. 

 

Essentially, the defendant argued that the statutory mandatory minimums promulgated by the FSA applied to him, making him eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Court found that the defendant satisfied the first sentence-reduction eligibility requirement because his sentence had been based on the Guidelines.  The plea agreement had said that the parties agreed to recommend that the district court impose a sentence within the guideline range.  During the sentencing hearing, the district court had said that “[t]he parties agree to recommend that the Court impose a sentence within the range determined pursuant to the advisory sentencing guidelines” and that “the appropriate sentencing range under the guidelines according to the sentencing table is 130 to 162 months.”  The district court started with the drug-quantity table in 2D1.1.  The court then relied on 3E1.1 and 5K1.1, cited in the plea agreement, to calculate the defendant’s advisory range as 130 to 162 months; the district court sentenced the defendant to 130 months.  This imposition of sentence pursuant to the plea agreement and derived from an advisory range under the Guidelines means the sentence was based on an advisory range.

 

COA then looked to 5G1.1 to consider impact of mandatory minimum.  The COA found that the section was silent as to which mandatory minimums to apply, and that the Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue.  

 

The court noted that under the gov's interpretation, defendants whose original advisory ranges were slightly above the old statutory floor, but who did not receive substantial-assistance downward departures, would be eligible for sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(2).  But defendants whose original ranges were at the statutory floor, who rendered substantial assistance, would not be eligible for reductions.  "Such perverse results are clearly inconcsistent with other Guidelines provisions."  Here, plugging the new mandatory minimums  and amended guidelines into the defendant's calculations would yield a sentence of 70 months instead of 130.  The court found that applying the new minimums "is the only way to give effect to Congress's intent to achieve consistency with other Guidelines provisions, especially with regard to which kinds of defendants---cooperative and uncooperative---are eligible for sentence reductions." 

The COA distinguishes Carradine and Dorsey.  These two cases "stand for the proposition that defendants who were sentenced after August 3, 2010, [the FSA's effective date] were entitled to be sentenced under the new FSA minimums at their original sentencing hearings."  The COA here admonishes that 3582(c)(2) hearings are not plenary proceedings like the latter original sentencing hearings.  Carradine and Dorsey did not address the application of mandatory minimums in the 3582(c)(2) context. 

A reduction here would be consistent with Guidelines policy statements.  The applicable guideline range here "automatically incorporates the statutory minimums in the cocaine base sentencing statutes . . . via 1B1.1(a)(8), which interlocks with 5G1.1---the section of the Guidelines that incorporates the statutory minimums."  As the new minimums are the applicable minimums in the 1B1.10(b)(1) calculation, Amendment 750 lowers the applicable guideline range.  So a sentence reduction is consistent with the Sentencing Commission's policy statement in 1B1.10(a)(2)(B).  The statements in application note 1(a)(A) to 1B1.10 do not change this reasoning. 

The COA notes that "[e]ach time the Supreme Court has heard cases involving the FSA, it has expanded the class of defendants who are entitled to or eligible for the benefits of lowered penalties under the FSA." 

Judge Cole concurred:

He would resolve the case on narrower grounds.  The sentence here was based on a subsequently lowered guideline range, rather than a mandatory minimum.  But Judge Cole would hang his hat on the substantial assistance.  The 5K "effectively 'waived' the mandatory minimum and permitted the district court to impose a sentence based on [the] otherwise-applicable guideline range."  This approach "obviates the need to delve any further into the controversy surrounding the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act."  Judge Cole would wait for the en banc Blewett proceedings before saying more. . . . 

Judge Rodgers dissented:

Notes that Blewett could be resolved with this opinion if the en banc court were to accept it.  Believes that at this time the panel is bound by Hammond.  Does not see substantial assistance as getting around this block. 

Crack Retro and Career Offenders

Check out United States v. Jackson, No. 10-3923 (6th Cir. May 8, 2012) (for publication), for news on career offenders and the retroactive crack amendments.

It's discussed on the Sixth Cir. blog at www.circuit6.blogspot.com.

Crack Reductions: Darn It!

(This picture is just so random!)
United States v. McKinney, No. 11-1439 (6th Cir. Feb. 23, 2012) (unpublished). 

Chief Judge Batchelder, and Judges Norris and Stranch. 

District court denied a crack reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2).  Court of appeals affirmed this denial.

2004 conviction for guns and drugs.  As part of the plea deal, the government agreed to dismiss a count that would have carried a consecutive thirty-year mandatory sentence (for having a destructive device).  In '04, highest base offense level was 38 (more than 1.5 kilos of crack).  That's what this defendant got.  Ended up with a total offense level of 37, criminal history category IV, and range of 292 to 365 months. 

Defendant did not object to the original PSR.  District court sentenced defendant to 292 months + 120 months (concurrent) on gun count.  Sentence fell to 235 months after a Rule 35. 

After the first round of crack amendments, the defendant sought a reduction in sentence.  Probation did not recommend a reduction, finding that the PSR established the defendant was responsible for more than 4.5 kilos of crack, the new threshold for level 38.  The district court (who was not the original sentencing judge) found that the only original determination was that the defendant was responsible for at least 1.5 kilos.  That quantity would put the defendant at base offense level 36 under the first set of amendments. 

The district court requested supplemental briefing regarding how the court should exercise its discretion.  The government moved for a second Rule 35 reduction.  The case was reassigned and returned to the original sentencing judge. 

The original sentencing judge ruled against a reduction under 3582(c)(2).  Looked to the original sentencing record and the PSR, to which the defendant had not objected.  Court found that the defendant was responsible for more than 4.5 kilos.  Court found that this conclusion was not inconsistent with the original findings b/c 4.5 kilos is in excess of 1.5 kilos, the only original determination.  The court did grant the Rule 35 and reduced the sentence to 214 months. 

The court of appeals concluded that:
* The defendant had accepted all of the facts in the PSR b/c he did not object to them. 
* The PSR confirmed that the defendant was responsible for at least 6 kilos of crack. 
* United States v. Moore, 582 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 2009), said that a new factual finding of a higher quantity is not inconsistent with an original finding of "at least" 1.5 kilos. 

SCOTUS Grants Cert to Resolve FSA Issues

Sorry for the delay in posting. 

The Supreme Court has granted cert in two cases to resolve the circuit split over FSA "pipeline" cases (cases involving pre-FSA conduct and post-FSA sentencing).  I posted to the Sixth Circuit blog earlier; here is the info again:

The Supreme Court has granted cert in two FSA "pipeline" cases to resolve the circuit split over whether or not the FSA applies to defendants whose conduct pre-dated the FSA, but who were sentenced after the FSA was enacted.

The cases are Hill v. United States, No. 11-5721, and Dorsey v. United States, 11-5683.

Question presented in Dorsey:

"Did the Seventh Circuit err when, in conflict with the First and Eleventh Circuits, it held that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 does not apply to all defendants sentenced after its enactment?"

Dovetailing with the FSA theme, the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in United States v. Thigpen, No. 10-3127 (6th Cir. Nov. 21, 2011) (unpublished), last week. Court again followed Carradine and denied FSA relief to the defendant, who was sentenced on January 28, 2010. The Court did state that the defendant "was properly sentenced under the law applicable at the time his crimes were committed." This language is broad, but given the defendant's sentencing date, it is dicta in "'pipeline" cases (defendants sentenced after the FSA was enacted, whose offenses pre-dated the FSA).

Stop! Or I'll tase you! (+FSA)

I just wanted to blog this case b/c the police are quoted as saying: "Stop! Police! Or I'll tase you!" There's just charm to such cries! (Plus, I was a big Tom Swift fan growing up, and I read somewhere that TASER is a random acronym. The guy who came up with the taser didn't know what to call it, so he decided on Tom A. Swift's Electric Rifle, or TASER. You really needed to know that. . . .)

So, Court of Appeals upholds denial of a motion to suppress in United States v. Ruff, No. 08-4428 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 2011) (unpublished). Panel of Chief Judge Batchelder, and Judges Boggs and White.

Defendant argued that the officer's initial approach to the defendant, during which the officer identified himself as a police officer, was an arrest requiring probable cause. Defendant argued the officer lacked PC for an arrest, and even reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. Court finds the encounter was neither an arrest nor a Terry stop. The defendant was not seized. The officers had approached some men drinking beer in a high-crime area on a stoop with no-trespassing signs around it (after they had received a tip re drugs and a gun from a reliable informant). The officers identified themselves as police officers. The defendant immediately fled.

Court goes on to say that even if there was a seizure, it was, at most, a Terry stop. The officers had received a tip (from a reliable informant) that a person matching the defendant's description had drugs and a gun. Such a tip can establish reasonable suspicion to support a stop. So there was reasonable suspicion to support a stop here.

The defendant next argued that he was arrested when the officer deployed the taser and there was no PC for an arrest then b/c the defendant threw the gun away at the same time the officer deployed the taser. The Court rejected the argument. The officer did not deploy the taser until he saw the gun, so he had PC. The tip, the flight, the disposal of the gun all gave the officer PC for an arrest.

Defendant next argued that the FSA should have applied to him. The offense occurred on November 21, 2007. The Court cites Carradine, saying the FSA is not retroactive. This case is a Carradine case: sentencing and appellate briefing occurred prior to enactment of the FSA on Aug. 3, 2010.

FSA Remand

United States v. A. . ., No. 11-XXXX (6th Cir. Aug. 16, 2011) (sealed case). Judges Suhrheinrich, Siler, McKeague. (Call the Defender's Office at 616-742-7420 and ask for Clare Freeman if you want the details on the case.)

Defendant appealed his crack conviction. He was sentenced to the 60-month mandatory minimum (pre-FSA). Gov had argued at sentencing that the FSA did not apply.

Court's order reads: "The government has now changed its position on this issue and maintains that the FSA applies to all sentencings that occur after August 3, 2010." The defendant and the government jointly moved for remand. Court granted, but expressed "no opinion as to whether the FSA is applicable."

More Crack Action

So, in a number of circuits, the AUSAs are agreeing to appellate dismissals or motions to remand. That's happening now.

In the Sixth Circuit:

The gov filed a letter in U.S. v. McCray, No. 11-3249 (6th Cir. July 20, 2011), saying:

"In its brief, the United States argued that the district court had not erred. Upon further consideration of the proper interpretation of the Fair Sentencing Act, however, the United States is now of the view that the Act’s revised penalties apply to any defendant sentenced on or after the enactment date, August 3, 2010—including McCray."

Gov acknowledges Carradine, but says it is distinguishable.

In the Seventh Circuit (where they face the adverse Fisher decision), there's a tiny rumor that the gov may seek review en banc on the issue (the rumor is based on a filing in another case) or seek S Ct review.

Nothing really definite on 2255s. Not yet....

Crack: More Info re AG Holder's Memo

If you have a client sentenced AFTER Aug. 3 who was sentenced under the OLD mand mins, try to get that client some relief: If they are currently on direct appeal as appellee, see if the AUSA will move to dismiss the appeal; if they are appellant, try to get the AUSA, and then the Court, to agree to remand for resentencing.

Remember, career offenders are affected too! B/c CO offense level tied to statutory sentencing range.

If the 14 days for filing an appeal are up, seek an extension to file under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4).

2255s MAY be a last resort, but this potential avenue is pretty ambiguous right now.

Courts can still reject the parties' undisputed position that the FSA applies, but let's give it all we've got.

More on Crack: DOJ Memo

On July 15, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder issued a memo saying he concludes "that the law requires the application of the [Fair Sentencing] Act's new mandatory minimum sentencing provisions to all sentencings that occur after August 3, 2010, regardless of when the offense conduct took place." He directs prosecutors "to act consistently with these legal principles."

Professor Berman has blogged the issue and provides a link to the memo at:

http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2011/07/only-a-year-late-ag-holder-sees-light-and-reverses-course-on-fsa-pipeline-sentencing-issue.html

Retro Crack Changes

I've gotten several calls from panel attorneys asking about the June 30, 2011 decision by the Sentencing Commission to make the FSA crack guidelines retroactive. At this time, there's no way to know exactly how the issues will be handled. What we do know is that the changes do not go into effect until November 1, 2011.

The changes will not help people who were sentenced to mandatory minimum sentences (those mand mins are not affected by the GL changes). Career offenders are not likely to be eligible for relief.

Stay tuned at:

http://www.famm.org/

www.fd.org/odstb_CrackCocaine.htm

for information as things unfold.