Red Dog

Federal criminal defense, blitzes and otherwise, in the Sixth Circuit and beyond.

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Showing posts with label Rules of Evidence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rules of Evidence. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 28, 2013

Gunshot Residue

United States v. Stafford, No. 12-3238 (6th Cir. June 11, 2013) (for publication).  Panel of Judges Boggs, White, and McCalla (W.D. Tenn.).

Not a "new" case now, but worth noting.

Defendant (D) moved dist ct pre-trial to exclude gunshot-residue evidence, citing rules 702 and 403.  D asked for Daubert hrg.  Dist ct denied the motion. 

On appeal, the defendant made "four arguments regarding the inadmissibility of the gunshot-residue evidence. First, Stafford states that '[gunshot-residue] testing will not determine whether an individual fired a gun, was present when a gun was fired by someone else, or was merely in an environment in which [gunshot residue] existed.'  Stafford claims that because these three possible outcomes summarize the testimony of the Government's expert Robert Lewis—and because Lewis could not testify whether Stafford actually fired the weapon—Lewis 'could not reasonably make any conclusions as to the actual source of the six [gunshot-residue] particles found,' and therefore Lewis's testimony did not meet the standards of Daubert or Rule 702."  Dist ct allowed defense expert to testify regarding the evidence, but the defense did not call him. 

The defendant also argued that gunshot-residue evidence is imprecise.  COA said five particles on D's hand meant the conclusion that the D had residue on his hand was reliable. 

The argument that the particles could have been transferred inadvertantly was likewise unavailing.  COA found the evidence sufficiently reliable.  Defense cross-examined the gov expert on the point.  As to whether the police used proper techniques to gather the evidence, COA found these arguments do not go to reliability.  The arguments go to the weight of the evidence, not admissibility.  Cross-examination allowed jury to consider the weight of the evidence.    

Evidence not unfairly prejudicial under rule 403. 

Opinion also addresses ACCA.  Conviction for "aggravated riot" under Ohio law counts for ACCA purposes.  And it touches on 3C1.2, reckless endangerment.  3C1.2 applied: defendant threw loaded gun against a building near a crowded street and nightclub. 


Tuesday, July 17, 2012

CP Trial: Rape Shield, Double Jeopardy, and More

I just posted this one on the 6th Cir. blog b/c it's my week to post there.  So you may have seen it already....

United States v. Ogden, Nos. 09-6507/10-5276 (6th Cir. July 17, 2012) (to be published).

Panel of Judges Griffin, Kethledge, and Thapar (E.D. Ky.).

Case arose out of an on-line relationship between a 34-year-old man and a 15-year-old girl. Persuading a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct to produce child pornography (CP).

Defendant went to trial. On appeal, he argued that he should have been allowed to present evidence of on-line conversations b/t the victim and other men. He said this evidence was critical b/c it showed other men induced the victim to create the CP. The COA rejected the arguments and affirmed.

Issue I: Double Jeopardy.

* We've seen this issue more and more recently. Possession charge + receipt charge = double jeopardy? Not here.
* Ct cites United States v. Dudeck, 657 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2011).
* Possession charge here not a lesser included offense b/c receipt charge here involved receipt of images through a computer. The possession offense sprang from the transfer of the images to a different medium (an external hard drive).
* Different conduct, so possession not a lesser-included offense of receipt.

Issue II: Knowingly Receiving Images.

* D argued that to "knowingly receive images" one must know, the minute one receives an image and w/o even having looked at it, that the image is CP.
* Not so; one need only be aware that "receipt of the illegal images 'is practically certain to follow'" from one's conduct.
* And there was ample evidence that D here was practically certain that he would receive CP.

Issue III: Someone Other than D Coaxed Victim to Produce Images.

* Record shows D asked victim to produce images. She produced pics during her "relationship" with D.
* Gov did not violate Brady by failing to produce the chat logs (until the day before trial) of victim's conversations with other men. Logs not admissible b/c of Rule 412, so not subject to Brady.
* Dist ct didn't abuse discretion by refusing to adjourn trial b/c of this evidence.
* Due process and Constitution don't trump here b/c logs not critical to D's defense. Enough other evid that D induced victim to engage in sexual conduct and film it. Rape-shield interests were strong here: protects victims and encourages them to come forward, the COA found. And victim here a minor, so even stronger interest.

Issue IV: Restitution.

* D argued that dist ct should have admitted the chat logs at restitution hearing. D was required to pay most of victim's psychotherapy costs.
* But nothing in record that dist ct excluded chat logs at hearing.
* And rules of evidence don't apply at sentencing, so can't assume the dist ct excluded the evidence.

Wednesday, March 28, 2012

Rape-Shield Issues on Habeas

Sorry for the delay in posting.  Little hectic.  It was nice saying hello to many of you at CDAM in Novi a couple weeks ago.

Jordan v. Warden, Lebanon Correctional Institution, No. 10-3064 (6th Cir. Mar. 27, 2012) (for publication).

Panel of Judges Gilman, Rogers, and Stranch.

District court denied the petitioner's application for habeas relief (he had been convicted in Ohio court of rape and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor; eight-year sentence). 

Issue: did the state trial ct violate the petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights to present a defense and confront witnesses by improperly applying Ohio's rape-shield law. 

The COA affirmed the dist ct's denial of habeas relief.

Petitioner claimed he never had sex with the alleged victim.  On direct examination, the alleged victim claimed the petitioner raped her, and that it was her first experience with sex.  Defense counsel did not inquire into that latter assertion on direct examination. 

A friend of the alleged victim testified.  On cross-examination, defense counsel asked if the alleged victim had ever confided in the friend--witness that the alleged victim was having sex with people.  The friend--witness said yes, the alleged victim had so confided.  The prosecutor objected, arguing the rape-shield rules applied. 

During the bench conference on the issue, the defense stated it was not trying to get into prior sexual conduct; it was a matter of credibility.  The alleged victim had testified that it was her first sexual encounter, so the information on prior encounters went to credibility.  The trial court sustained the objection. 

Petitioner appealed to the Ohio appellate court.  Argued he should have been allowed to present the evidence of the alleged victim's sexual history.  Argued that the state had waived the rape-shield protections by choosing to introduce evidence regarding the alleged victim's lack of past sexual activity.  The Ohio appellate court found that the doctrine of waiver did not apply in the situation.  It rejected the merits of the petitioner's argument. 

The petitioner never tried to cross-examine the alleged victim on the point at issue.  So he cannot argue a confrontation-clause error to seek habeas relief.  The defense also did not object on rape-shield grounds to the state's questioning of the alleged victim regarding her alleged lack of sexual history.  The petitioner waived his challenge to the scope of cross-examination of the alleged victim. 

In terms of the cross-examination of the alleged victim's friend, trial judges have wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination.  Rape-shield laws impose such a limit.  B/c the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled explicitly on the issue of waiver in the rape-shield context, and b/c of the broad latitude the trial ct has on evidentiary issues, the Ohio COA's decision on waiver was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 

In terms of the substance of that cross-examination, only cross-examination seeking evidence of bias or other motivations for a witness's testimony is constitutionally protected.  The Supreme Court has not suggested that the Constitution always confers a right to impeach the general credibility of a witness.  The Supreme Court has also not recognized a right under the Confrontation Clause to impeach adverse witnesses by putting on a third-party witness. 

The state argued that its questioning about the alleged victim's lack of sexual history did not fall under the rape-shield bar.  While questioning "the soundness of this argument," the COA (6th Cir) did not address the scope of the rape-shield law.  Rather, the COA concluded that the trial court did not err in applying the rape-shield law, even if the state's questioning about the alleged victim's lack of sexual history should have been excluded.  The defense had not objected during that questioning.  The state, on the other hand, did object during the defense's cross-examination of the alleged victim's friend.

No confrontation-clause errors based on the limitations the Ohio trial ct placed on the defense's cross-examination of the alleged victim's friend.  Even if there had been error, it would not lead to relief b/c it would be harmless.  The alleged victim's sexual history was a collateral topic and not relevant to the central issues at trial.