Red Dog

Federal criminal defense, blitzes and otherwise, in the Sixth Circuit and beyond.

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Showing posts with label Substantial Assistance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Substantial Assistance. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 28, 2013

The Crack Plot Thickens

OK, yesterday, United States v. Doe was released.  No case #.  Panel of Judges Keith, Cole, and Rogers.  It's for publication and there's a concurrence by Cole and a dissent by Rogers.  The opinion is good:
 
"For the reasons stated above, we hold that applying the new [FSA crack] minimums in Defendant’s § 1B1.10(b)(1) calculation is the only way to give effect to Congress’s intent to achieve consistency with other Guidelines provisions, especially with regard to which kinds of defendants—cooperative and uncooperative—are eligible for sentence reductions."
 
Defense counsel is likely to be able to surmise why the COA redacted. 
 
The crack issues swirl on. . . .

Tuesday, August 20, 2013

Lightening Strikes Twice: Blewett Revived!

OK, oral argument in Blewett set for Oct. 9.  In the meantime, we have United States v. X, No. X (6th Cir. Aug. 20, 2013) (for publication).  Panel of Judges Keith, Cole, and Rogers.  Judge Keith penned the lead opinion.  Judge Cole concurred.  And Judge Rogers dissented. 


 

Essentially, the defendant argued that the statutory mandatory minimums promulgated by the FSA applied to him, making him eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Court found that the defendant satisfied the first sentence-reduction eligibility requirement because his sentence had been based on the Guidelines.  The plea agreement had said that the parties agreed to recommend that the district court impose a sentence within the guideline range.  During the sentencing hearing, the district court had said that “[t]he parties agree to recommend that the Court impose a sentence within the range determined pursuant to the advisory sentencing guidelines” and that “the appropriate sentencing range under the guidelines according to the sentencing table is 130 to 162 months.”  The district court started with the drug-quantity table in 2D1.1.  The court then relied on 3E1.1 and 5K1.1, cited in the plea agreement, to calculate the defendant’s advisory range as 130 to 162 months; the district court sentenced the defendant to 130 months.  This imposition of sentence pursuant to the plea agreement and derived from an advisory range under the Guidelines means the sentence was based on an advisory range.
 
COA then looked to 5G1.1 to consider impact of mandatory minimum.  The COA found that the section was silent as to which mandatory minimums to apply, and that the Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue.  
 
The court noted that under the gov's interpretation, defendants whose original advisory ranges were slightly above the old statutory floor, but who did not receive substantial-assistance downward departures, would be eligible for sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(2).  But defendants whose original ranges were at the statutory floor, who rendered substantial assistance, would not be eligible for reductions.  "Such perverse results are clearly inconcsistent with other Guidelines provisions."  Here, plugging the new mandatory minimums  and amended guidelines into the defendant's calculations would yield a sentence of 70 months instead of 130.  The court found that applying the new minimums "is the only way to give effect to Congress's intent to achieve consistency with other Guidelines provisions, especially with regard to which kinds of defendants---cooperative and uncooperative---are eligible for sentence reductions." 

The COA distinguishes Carradine and Dorsey.  These two cases "stand for the proposition that defendants who were sentenced after August 3, 2010, [the FSA's effective date] were entitled to be sentenced under the new FSA minimums at their original sentencing hearings."  The COA here admonishes that 3582(c)(2) hearings are not plenary proceedings like the latter original sentencing hearings.  Carradine and Dorsey did not address the application of mandatory minimums in the 3582(c)(2) context. 

A reduction here would be consistent with Guidelines policy statements.  The applicable guideline range here "automatically incorporates the statutory minimums in the cocaine base sentencing statutes . . . via 1B1.1(a)(8), which interlocks with 5G1.1---the section of the Guidelines that incorporates the statutory minimums."  As the new minimums are the applicable minimums in the 1B1.10(b)(1) calculation, Amendment 750 lowers the applicable guideline range.  So a sentence reduction is consistent with the Sentencing Commission's policy statement in 1B1.10(a)(2)(B).  The statements in application note 1(a)(A) to 1B1.10 do not change this reasoning. 

The COA notes that "[e]ach time the Supreme Court has heard cases involving the FSA, it has expanded the class of defendants who are entitled to or eligible for the benefits of lowered penalties under the FSA." 

Judge Cole concurred:

He would resolve the case on narrower grounds.  The sentence here was based on a subsequently lowered guideline range, rather than a mandatory minimum.  But Judge Cole would hang his hat on the substantial assistance.  The 5K "effectively 'waived' the mandatory minimum and permitted the district court to impose a sentence based on [the] otherwise-applicable guideline range."  This approach "obviates the need to delve any further into the controversy surrounding the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act."  Judge Cole would wait for the en banc Blewett proceedings before saying more. . . . 

Judge Rodgers dissented:

Notes that Blewett could be resolved with this opinion if the en banc court were to accept it.  Believes that at this time the panel is bound by Hammond.  Does not see substantial assistance as getting around this block. 






Wednesday, March 28, 2012

Proffers and Info in PSRs

United States v. Merlo, No. 10-2003 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 2012) (unpublished).

Panel of Judges Merritt, Boggs, and Clay.

Just a quick note on this unpublished case that addresses the use of proffer info at sentencing.

Tax-fraud case.  Defendant argued on appeal that the government violated the plea agreement by using information he provided while cooperating against him at sentencing and for calculating restitution.  The COA affirmed. 

Plain-error review. 

The information the dist ct considered at sentencing was not new information the D had provided.  It was info the D had had to provide in answer to a grand-jury subpoena.  So dist ct did not err in considering it.  Also, it was not clear that the info was used to determine the GL range, the D's sentence within the range, or the extent of the the departure.

Regardless of the info at issue, there was ample evidence against the D.     

Thursday, January 19, 2012

Mand Mins and Substantial Assistance

United States v. Hawn, No. 10–2098 (6th Cir. Jan. 11, 2012) (not for publication).

Panel of Judges Daughtrey, Cole, and Rogers.

United States v. Traxler, No. 10-1792 (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 2012) (not for publication).

Panel of Judges Kennedy, Martin, and Stranch.

Government appealed in both cases. Both defendants qualified for the ACCA 15-year mand min. Gov had released both defendants’ mand mins b/c of substantial assistance under 18 USC 3553(e).

Hawn got a year and a day. Traxler got five years.

The district court in Hawn disagreed with the government’s contention that any downward departure had to be based only on substantial assistance. The district court found it could vary based on the 3553(a) factors.

The Hawn Court found that:

* The district court should have started its analysis of a potential downward departure from the mand min, not the otherwise applicable GL range (here, the applicable range was less than the mand min, so the mand min should have become the range).

* The district court should not have departed based on the 3553(a) factors " without mentioning whether or how these factors related to or gave context to [the] substantial assistance."

* The district court had "the limited authority to impose a sentence below the minimum to reflect [the defendant’s] substantial assistance." The Court cited United States v. Bullard, 390 F.3d 413 (6th Cir. 2004), and United States v. Grant, 636 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 2011). The Court found that Grant applies in the 3553(e) context as well.

The Court vacated the sentence.

The Court also made some notes for resentencing:

* The district court has only the authority to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum based on the defendant’s substantial assistance.

* BUT the district court has "broad discretion" to consider a number of "contextual factors" to evaluate the value of the defendant’s assistance, the extent of the downward departure.

* The district court is not bound by the government’s recommendation of a two-level downward departure. Can give a greater or lesser departure. But the value of the assistance is the "governing principle." Any reduction should not exceed the value of the assistance.

The Traxler Court found that:

* The gov had not objected at sentencing, so plain-error review applied.

* Bullard applied.

* Interplay between the government’s downward-departure motion and the defense’s motion for a variance was confusing and the district court did not address how it reached its sentence, so remand was justified.

As in Hawn, the Court vacated the sentence.

Judge Stranch dissented:

* Found the sentence resulted from two separate motions: the gov’s motion for a downward departure and the defense’s motion for a downward variance.

* The district court adequately explained the sentence and the sentence should stand.