Red Dog

Federal criminal defense, blitzes and otherwise, in the Sixth Circuit and beyond.

To subscribe to this blog by e-mail, enter your e-mail address in the box below.
Showing posts with label Pretextual Stops. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pretextual Stops. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 12, 2012

On What Night Would You Host a Bachelor Party? And Does the Choice of Night Give Rise to Reasonable Suspicion?

An interesting question I'm sure we've all pondered: on what night should one host a bachelor party?

United States v. Rodriguez, No. 10-1874 (6th Cir. June 12, 2012) (unpublished). 

Judges McKeague, White, and Barrett (S.D. Ohio).

Per curiam.

Cocaine and heroin case.  Defendant appealed denial of motion to suppress.  COA affirmed.

Michigan State Trooper stopped D on I-94.  The trooper had been sitting in a marked police car and had been watching eastbound traffic.  Trooper saw the D lean back in his seat "in an apparent attempt to hide behind the door post" when the D passed the trooper.  Trooper began following the D.  Stopped D for following a semi-truck too closely.

After stop, no ticket issued.  Trooper told D that D was free to go, but then asked if he could ask the D something.  About four minutes of questions.  D ultimately consented to a search of the van and officers found kilos of heroin and cocaine. 

B/c there was a traffic violation, the stop was legal.  D did not provide testimony to contradict a finding that he was driving too closely behind the truck.

D not unlawfully detained after end of traffic stop b/c a reasonable person would have believed they were free to go after being told they were "good to go."  Police may ask questions after a traffic stop has ended.  No factors to indicate there was a further seizure here.   

The D had been in the back of the police car, so more analysis was required.  But still not a seizure, the COA found, b/c trooper had let D in the car to get out of the cold (D had been standing outside). 

And, COA continued, even if there was a seizure, there was reasonable suspicion to support it.  And here's where the bachelor party comes in. 

Factors COA found established reasonable suspicion:
* D had leaned back in his seat when he passed the patrol car in an apparent attempt to hide his face behind the door post;
* D slowed down when he passed the patrol car; 
* That stretch of I-94 (between Chicago and Detroit) is considered a "pipeline corridor" for drugs; 
* The van smelled strongly of air fresheners (commonly used to mask drug odors);
* The van was not registered to D; 
* D had stated that he was going to his cousin’s bachelor party, but he said he did not know the date of the wedding;
* D said the party was on a Thursday, "an unusual night for a bachelor party."

COA found that these factors, viewed in their totality, were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.

Judge White dissented.

She found that the D had been detained without reasonable suspicion after the traffic stop was completed.  A reasonable person would not have felt free to leave.  No reasonable suspicion to justify seizure.  All the factors the majority cited were weak.  "There is nothing inherently suspicious about a bachelor party being held on a Thursday." 

Consent to search was tainted.  Evidence should have been suppressed. 

Friday, October 21, 2011

Cop Gets 225 Years for Setting Up Drug Deals for $






United States v. Sease, No. 09-5790 (6th Cir. Oct. 21, 2011) (to be published). Panel of Judges Cole, Rogers, and Griffin.


Former Memphis police officer appealed convictions stemming from a conspiracy to set up drug buys for the purpose of seizing drugs and money for personal profit. Jury convicted him on 44 counts, including charges of conspiring to deprive another of civil rights under color of law, and robbery and extortion under color of official right. Ct sentenced defendant to 225 years.


Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. Argued he did not violate the rights of the drug-buy participants b/c there was probable cause to arrest the drug dealers and seize the drugs and money. COA affirmed the convictions.


There was a question regarding whether the defendant was challenging the sufficiency of the evidence or just a jury instruction. Ct found it was the former.


Defendant looked to Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), to argue his position. (Whren is the pretextual-traffic-stops-are-OK case.) Ct rejected the defendant's reasoning, finding that "it is inherently improper for officers to set up drug deals for the purpose of taking the money and drugs for themselves, regardless of the context." The defendant's "actions are improper in an entirely different way and to an entirely different degree than the actions of the officers in Whren."


Whren’s holding that an officer's intentions are irrelevant in the Fourth Amendment analysis "comes out of a concern that courts are poorly positioned to engage in post hoc analysis of officer motivations, particularly in light of the snap decisions that law enforcement officers must make in stressful situations." This defendant, however, "was not faced with a complex set of assessments when he made his stops—the stops were pre-planned and staged to accomplish his criminal purpose."


The punitive purpose of 18 U.S.C. 242 "would be undermined were the court to allow a corrupt officer to hide behind the policy goals of the exclusionary rule." While the subjective intent of officers is irrelevant for purposes of the exclusionary rule, in the § 242 context, courts may inquire whether an officer acted with a corrupt, personal, and pecuniary purpose.


Unlike in the exclusionary rule context, a court must inquire into the subjective intent of the officer because willfulness is an element of an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 242, so there is no additional evidentiary burden to justify ignoring an officer's subjective intent. And while there are "few reported cases that deal with this level of officer misconduct, those that do exist all agree that purely illegal activities by law enforcement constitute a constitutional violation."


The Court cites United States v. Parker, 165 F. Supp. 2d 431, 441 (W.D.N.Y. 2001), in which "three Buffalo police officers, along with a DEA agent, entered into an agreement with a 'known drug trafficker' to arrange a meeting with a more prominent 'Jamaican drug dealer.' The plan was for the officers to rob the drug dealer’s safe house and divide the proceeds from the robbery between themselves, as well as detain the drug dealer and take cash and drugs off his person. In truth, the 'Jamaican drug dealer' was an FBI undercover agent and the officers’ contact was an FBI confidential informant." The officers in that case had also cited Whren in advancing arguments similar to those in Sease's case. The appellate court rejected the arguments, finding that willful conduct by officers, done with the specific intent to violate people's rights, supports conviction under § 242. The appellate case is United States v. Ferby, 108 F. App’x 676 (2d Cir. 2004).


Court here found "where, as here, there is clear evidence that the officers were not engaged in bona fide law enforcement activities, but instead acted with a corrupt, personal, and pecuniary interest, the officers violate the civil rights of those that are stopped, searched, or have their property seized." The defendant "deprived those that he targeted of their constitutional rights, and thus his convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 are supported by sufficient evidence."