Red Dog

Federal criminal defense, blitzes and otherwise, in the Sixth Circuit and beyond.

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Showing posts with label SCOTUS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SCOTUS. Show all posts

Thursday, December 5, 2013

More Blewett: Dissenting Opinions

I just posted on the 6th Cir. blog too. . . .  My week to blog there.

Judge Merritt's Blewett dissent:

* Restoring fairness and enforcing a "no-change" sentencing policy based on "finality" are incongruous.  Congress intended to remedy irrationality and disproportion.  Court is thwarting this effort. 
* Cites NACDL and NAACP amicus briefs. 
* "Practically all observers" now recognize the ills of the old system. 

Judge Cole's dissent:

* Applying 100-to-1 ratio and mandatory minimums to deny 3582(c)(2) relief violates equal-protection principles. 
* African-Americans treated more harshly than Caucasian offenders under this regime.  And  88% of the inmates that would be eligible for a reduction if mand mins not a bar are African-American. 
* Claim of "finality" cannot withstand even rational-basis scrutiny under equal-protection principles.
* "Finality " not a bar to other 3582(c)(2) resentencings.  Irrational to allow sentence to be lowered in one case and not the other. . . .
* Quotes Judge Nathaniel Jones: "As judges, we should no longer remain wedded to that which experience shows is neither rational nor fair." 

Judge Clay's dissent:

* Majority is furthering prior injustice by holding that the FSA is not retro.  Individuals like Blewetts will continue to be imprisoned "in a disproportionate, unjustified manner, in violation of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause." 
* Not sure of procedural mechanism for relief. 
* "Although the FSA is not facially discriminatory, an interpretation of the FSA foreclosing the retroactive application of its new mandatory minimums would present an equal protection problem inasmuch as it would subject a group that is overwhelmingly predominately African American to starkly different treatment under the law.  Such an interpretation can meet neither strict scrutiny nor rational basis review and should therefore be avoided by this Court."
* "Adopting new mandatory minimums for the purpose of righting the racially discriminatory wrongs of the past and not extending the benefits of the new enactment to the thousands of predominately African American individuals serving disproportionate sentences under a now-rejected statue violates equal protection because Congress has recognized and reaffirmed 'its adverse effects' upon the African American community."
* Congress has distinguished crack and powder offenders, "the former being overwhelmingly impoverished African Americans."  This group---crack offenders---is exceedingly "abject, disparaged, powerless," a minority group that may be the most powerless.  Here the democratic process "breaks down" and "traditional rational basis review is insufficient to protect the group of individuals convicted under federal crack cocaine mandatory minimums."  More than 82% of this group is African-American (2005 stat).  The courts should not defer "to government enactments under circumstances where an irrational classification based on the form of cocaine, which has real-world consequences in terms of sentencing disparities, tracks so closely with race."  No legitimate penological/pharmacological reason for the continued incarceration of inmates who were subjected to extended sentences under the repudiated 100-to-1 ratio.  In the face of a "more rigorous rational basis standard, the government can only offer finality as its legitimate interest in support of the continued application of the old mandatory minimums."  Won't cut it. 

Judge Rogers's dissent:

* Finds that "Dorsey supports the idea that, when a post-Fair Sentencing Act sentence is properly calculated under 3582(c)(2) because a guideline has been retroactively changed, the new statutory minimums should be applied as well.  In other words, when a post-Fair Sentencing Act sentencing court properly has before it the calculation of a sentence, the court should use the Fair Sentencing Act minimums."
* Majority's analysis is anomalous.
* With Dorsey in view, not logical to rely on saving statute's default rule. 
* 3582(c)(2) = Congress's "background principle of retroactivity." 
* Illogical to provide GL relief and not statutory relief. 
* Cites argument re. "worse guys" who were sentenced above GLs getting break while less culpable guys (sentenced at mand min) not getting break. 
* "It may be that the Supreme Court Justices and litigants in Dorsey assumed that the 18-1 minimums could not be applied whenever sentencing occurred prior to the Fair Sentencing Act's passage.  But assumptions are not law.  Likewise the holdings of other circuits, and of our prior three-judge panels, are not binding, however persuasive they may or may not be.  The plain fact is that the language of the Fair Sentencing Act does not require the anomaly that the 18-1 ratio applies retroactively to reduce guideline-driven sentences but not mandatory minimum-driven sentences, when both the guidelines and the minimums were reduced by the Fair Sentencing Act."
* Somewhat distinguishes the adverse law in other circuits.  (Footnote 1.)
* "This analysis does not mean that the Sentencing Commission is trumping the statute.  The revised statutory minimums are, after all, created by statute.  The Sentencing Commission, acting properly under 28 U.S.C. 994(u), made the Fair Sentencing Act-driven guidelines retroactive.  Doing so provided the statutory key to making the statutory minimum changes applicable under 3582.  This is a reasonable statutory interpretation, and it is particularly reasonable to avoid an incoherent anomaly."
* Does agree with majority that constitutional avoidance doesn't apply. 
Judge White's dissent:

* She concurs in Judge Rogers's dissent and writes "separately to express the view that the fair implication of the Fair Sentencing Act is that Congress intended that the Sentencing Commission determine whether and to what extent the newly enacted increased base-cocaine quantity thresholds for triggering mandatory minimum sentences would be applicable to defendants already under sentence.  Further, allowing application of the new 18:1 ratio to all offenders already under sentence except those whose sentences under the new ratio would clash with the old 100:1 ratio's mandatory minimum sentences bears no rational relation to any identified Congressional purpose."
* "It is the majority that turns the Fair Sentencing Act on its head by its rigid adherence to the general savings statute in the face of the Commission's clear authority to establish the new guidelines based on the greater mandatory-minimum thresholds and to decide whether and to what extent the new thresholds should be applied to prisoners under sentence."
* She addresses several arguments regarding the Commission's powers. 
* "The Blewetts's claim does not rest on an asserted constitutional right to the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act.  It rests on the irrationality of allowing its application to all sentences that have become final and are affected by the new guidelines except sentences based on the very mandatory minimum levels that the Fair Sentencing Act amended.  Congress did not intend this irrationality, and that is why Judge Rogers is correct.  Nevertheless, if Congress is understood to have the intent ascribed to it by the majority, that intent is irrational and violates the  Equal Protection Clause absent rational justification other than finality."

Wednesday, December 4, 2013

Blewett Decided

I just posted this note to the 6th Cir. blog too. 

Well, the Sixth Circuit en banc released Blewett yesterday.  Get out your hankies.  This one's a tear jerker.

United States v. Blewett, Nos. 12-5226/5582 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 2013).  The majority opinion is by Judge Sutton.  Judge Moore concurred.  Judges Merritt, Donald, Cole, Clay, Rogers, White, and Stranch dissented. 

The COA framed the issue: "whether the changes created by the [Fair Sentencing] Act apply to defendants sentenced five years before the new law took effect." 

Conclusion: "Consistent with a 142-year-old congressional presumption against applying reductions in criminal penalties to those already sentenced, 1 U.S.C. 109, consistent with the views of all nine Justices and all the litigants in Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2012), consistent with the decision of every other court of appeals in the country, and consistent with dozens of our own decisions, we hold that the Act does not retroactively undo final sentences.

As one defendant's custodial sentence has wrapped up and he's now on supervised release, the gov had moved the COA to dismiss his appeal as moot.  The COA found no need to address this issue, as there was no doubt about jurisdiction over at least one of the defendants in the consolidated appeal. 

*The FSA does not apply to those sentenced pre-FSA.
* 3582(c)(2) doesn't get around this prohibition.
* The Constitution can't help either. 

Points of interest:
* One can only get around 1 USC 109 if the statute expressly addresses it or clearly implies overcoming it.  Not present in FSA, which is "forward looking." 
* Distinguishes Dorsey. 
* All the federal courts of appeals have held the FSA does not apply to those sentenced before the FSA went into effect. 
* 3582(c)(2) does not help: these proceedings are not plenary resentencings. 
* Sentencing Commission has said that the amendments apply only to the GLs and do not affect statutory provisions. 
* Equal-protection and cruel-and-unusual arguments under the Constitution fail.  No racially discriminatory purpose, so disproportionate effect allowed to stand. 
* Gov "has a powerful interest in avoiding the disruption of final sentences." 
* 8th Am "is not a ratchet that makes a harsher system of penalties unconstitutional the moment a more lenient one is (prospectively) adopted."  Such a holding might actually discourage lawmakers from lowering sentences. 
* The courts simply lack the authority to lower the sentences here, even if there are policy arguments in favor of lower sentences. 
* Many believe "Congress should think seriously about making the new minimums retroactive."

Judge Moore's Concurrence:
* Agrees with majority's judgment, but has reservations. 
* Sees issues with jurisdiction (the one defendant is now on supervised release).  No "hypothetical jurisdiction" (assuming jurisdiction b/c the ct can easily boot the case on the merits).  Nevertheless, she would deny the gov's motion to dismiss.  Term of supervised release could be reduced if appeal determined favorably, so appeal not moot. 
* 1 USC 109 governs: no retroactivity. 
* Because of limits to 3582(c)(2), constitutionality of sentences not before COA, but challenge under 2255 could/should succeed.  Crack-powder disparity = racial disparity.  And no state treats crack and powder so disproportionately as the federal gov did pre-FSA, so 8th Am problem now. 

I will explore the dissent tomorrow. 

Tuesday, July 3, 2012

FSA Getting Fleshed Out

United States v. Finley, No. 10-3672 (6th Cir. June 29, 2012) (unpublished).

Panel of Judges McKeague, White, and Barrett (S.D. Ohio).

OK, so we got Dorsey on June 21: the FSA applies to defendants sentenced after the FSA went into effect, even if the offense occurred pre-FSA. 

Well, the Sixth Cir. just concluded that the FSA does not apply to people sentenced pre-FSA, even if their cases were on appeal when the FSA went into effect.  The COA rejected a Dorsey argument. 

Mandatory life on the table in Finley.  Jury found D guilty.  GL range of 151 to 188 months, but statute trumped and D got life in prison.  Mandatory minimum under the FSA would have been ten years (248 grams of crack + prior convictions).

COA looked to 1 U.S.C. 109 and Carradine.  Also looked to other circuits.  Cabined Dorsey to post-FSA sentencings.  COA rejected policy arguments.  Court also rejected argument about the case being on direct review: precedent on this issue applies only to S Ct decisions that come out---not to statutes. 

(The other issue was ineffective assistance of counsel.  While the defendant "raises serious questions about the competence of his defense counsel," ineffective-assistance claim not for direct appeal---needs to be in 2255.) 

COA affirmed.

Enjoy the 4th!

Wednesday, May 30, 2012

SCOTUS to Consider Standing to Challenge Wiretapping

The S Ct granted cert in Clapper v. Amnesty International, No. 11-1025 (May 21, 2012). 

Question presented includes a little background:

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. 1881a (Supp. II 2008) (Section 1881a) allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to authorize jointly the targeting of "non-United States" persons "reasonably believed" to be outside the United States.  This targeting would be to acquire "foreign intelligence information," and would normally be with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's prior approval. 

The respondents in this case are "United States persons who may not be targeted for surveillance under Section 1881a."  They filed their action on the day Section 1881a was enacted, and have sought a declaration that Section 1881a is unconstitutional, and an injunction permanently enjoining any foreign-intelligence surveillance under Section 1881a.

The crux of the issue is whether the respondents lack Article III standing to seek prospective relief because they have proffered no evidence that the United States would imminently acquire any of their international communications using Section 1881a-authorized surveillance.  And they have not shown that an injunction prohibiting Section 1881a-authorized surveillance would likely redress the claimed injuries.

Second Circuit decision at: 638 F.3d 118.

If you like standing issues (and you know we get them once in a while!) and/or wiretapping and dragnet-surveillance issues, keep your eyes on this one!  Fourth Amendment issues undergird the whole thing. 


Wednesday, January 25, 2012

Huge GPS Win! Must Have Warrant to Track with GPS!

United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (Jan. 23, 2012).  Justice Scalia wrote the opinion.  Chief Justice Roberts joined him, as did Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor.  Justice Sotomayor also filed a concurring opinion.  Justice Alito filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, and was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan.

The Supreme Court has concluded that tracking a vehicle by attaching a GPS device to it is a search. 

I know we've been seeing more and more of these cases in the district, especially in the Northern Division.

Authorities actually got a warrant to track the vehicle, but they installed the device after expiration of the warrant and outside of the authorized jurisdiction.  Over the course of four weeks, the tracker relayed more than 2,000 pages of data. 

Ultimately, gov charged defendant with cocaine offenses.  Defense filed motion to suppress based on use of the GPS.  Dist ct suppressed data obtained while the car was parked in the defendant's garage.  Ct admitted rest of data b/c from public thoroughfares.  A jury convicted the defendant and he received a sentence of life imprisonment. 

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding that warrantless use of the GPS violated the Fourth Amendment. 

Supreme Court held "that the Government's installation of a GPS devise on a target's vehicle, and its use of that devise to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a 'search.'"  The government here "physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information." 

The Court goes back to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century cases to discuss the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment.  Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at least until the later part of the last century.  More recent cases have deviated from the exclusively property-based approach.  Court cited Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 

The Court concluded that "Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation" (the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy formulation).  Rather, the Court must assure preservation of the degree of privacy that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.  For most of the country's history, the Fourth Amendment was understood to be concerned with government trespass upon the enumerated areas: persons, houses, papers, effects. 

The Court discussed the "beeper cases," the cases that had posed problems in the GPS context b/c they had rejected Fourth Amendment challenges to using a beeper to track items: Knotts and Karo.  The Court distinguished Knotts and Karo b/c the beeper was placed in the container with the consent of the owner at the time and prior to the container coming into the defendant's possession.  Here, the defendant possessed the vehicle at the time the authorities installed the GPS. 

Justice Sotomayor concurred:
* Found a search occurred.
* The reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test "augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the common-law trespassory test." 
* Found that "the trespassory test applied in the majority's opinion reflects an irreducible constitutional minimum: When the Government physically invades personal property to gather information, a search occurs.  The reaffirmation of that principle suffices to decide this case." 
 * Considered the issue of tracking that does not require trespass (e.g., factory-installed GPS devices tracked by the government).
* Cited Chief Judge Kozinski's (Ninth Cir.) opinion in Pineda-Moreno and acknowledged that "Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms."  The justice would take these factors into account when considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in one's movements. 

Justice Alito also filed a separate concurrence:
* Believes the majority opinion "strains the language of the Fourth Amendment," is not supported by case law, and "is highly artificial." 
* Would use the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. 
* Finds that the majority disregards the potential impact of the GPS and potential use of the information, and attaches too much importance to the placement of the unit on the car.  Explores some of the issues with property rights. 
* Concedes there are problems with the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. 
* Finds that short-term monitoring on public streets might be OK, but long-term monitoring would not be. 
* Legislation, rather than case law, may be the best means for addressing the issues. 


Friday, January 20, 2012

Tapia and Supervised Release

Supreme Court granted cert, vacated, and remanded to the Fifth Circuit in Breland v. United States, No. 11-6912 (Jan. 17, 2012). 

Gov conceded that Tapia applies in supervised-release context.  Can't lengthen prison time for purposes of rehab.

Wednesday, December 14, 2011

Abbott means what it says. . . .

United States v. Thomas, No. 09-3827 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 2011) (unpublished).  Panel of Judges Merritt, Moore, and Mays (W.D. Tenn.).

Conviction for possession of more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana with intent to distribute, and for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense.  Sentence of 151 months on the drugs + 60 months consecutive for the gun. 

Defendant argued it was error to impose the 60-month consecutive sentence given the 10-year minimum sentence for the drug count.  Defendant cited United States v. Williams, 558 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2009), in which the court concluded that the 924(c) sentence did not apply when the defendant was subject to a higher mandatory minimum for the predicate drug offense.  That was the old United States v. Almany, 598 F.3d 901 (6th Cir. 2010), argument.  Now, however, the S. Ct. has made it clear that the 924(c) sentence applies and is consecutive regardless of the mandatory minimum for the predicate offense.  Abbott v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 18 (2010).  Sentence affirmed.    

Monday, December 5, 2011

FBA SCOTUS Review Next Week

The WD Mich FBA is hosting their annual S Ct brown bag on Wednesday, Dec. 14, at noon in the jury assembly room (2nd floor of the fed cthouse).

http://www.westmichiganfederalbar.org/Federal_Bar_Calendar.php

See you there!

Monday, November 28, 2011

SCOTUS Grants Cert to Resolve FSA Issues

Sorry for the delay in posting. 

The Supreme Court has granted cert in two cases to resolve the circuit split over FSA "pipeline" cases (cases involving pre-FSA conduct and post-FSA sentencing).  I posted to the Sixth Circuit blog earlier; here is the info again:

The Supreme Court has granted cert in two FSA "pipeline" cases to resolve the circuit split over whether or not the FSA applies to defendants whose conduct pre-dated the FSA, but who were sentenced after the FSA was enacted.

The cases are Hill v. United States, No. 11-5721, and Dorsey v. United States, 11-5683.

Question presented in Dorsey:

"Did the Seventh Circuit err when, in conflict with the First and Eleventh Circuits, it held that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 does not apply to all defendants sentenced after its enactment?"

Dovetailing with the FSA theme, the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in United States v. Thigpen, No. 10-3127 (6th Cir. Nov. 21, 2011) (unpublished), last week. Court again followed Carradine and denied FSA relief to the defendant, who was sentenced on January 28, 2010. The Court did state that the defendant "was properly sentenced under the law applicable at the time his crimes were committed." This language is broad, but given the defendant's sentencing date, it is dicta in "'pipeline" cases (defendants sentenced after the FSA was enacted, whose offenses pre-dated the FSA).

Thursday, October 27, 2011

GPS Before the S Ct in Nov!

OK, here's an exciting issue slated for oral argument in the S Ct on Nov 8.

United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259.

Questions Presented:

Does the warrantless use of a tracking device on a vehicle to monitor the vehicle's movements on public streets violate the Fourth Amendment?

Does the government violate a person's Fourth Amendment rights by installing a GPS tracking device on that person's vehicle without a valid warrant and without the person's consent?

We have seen more and more GPS cases in the district, so this issue is one to bear in mind!  Preserve it!

Friday, October 14, 2011

More SCOTUS

Another case to watch is from the 6th Cir. with argument set for Halloween.

Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209.

Decision for 6th Cir. is 376 F. App`x 563.

Defendant charged with assault with intent to commit murder. Counsel advised him to reject plea offer b/c of a misunderstanding of Michigan law. Defendant rejected the offer. He was convicted as charged. (No trial error asserted.)

On habeas review, the 6th Cir. found that there was a reasonable probability that the defendant would have accepted the plea offer had he been properly advised. So his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. The writ was conditioned on the state once again offering the plea deal.

Questions presented are:

Whether a state habeas petitioner is entitled to relief when counsel deficiently advised him to reject a favorable plea deal, and defendant is later convicted after a fair trial.

What remedy, if any, should be provided for ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations if a defendant is later convicted under constitutionally adequate procedures?

Thursday, October 13, 2011

SCOTUS and Strip Searches

Sixth Circuit opinions are all immigration decisions this morning, so we're back in the S. Ct.

The Court heard argument yesterday in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, No. 10-945. Issue is whether the Fourth Amendment allows jails to conduct suspicionless strip searches of all arrestees, even those arrested for only minor offenses, regardless of the circumstances.

The petition for a writ of cert was granted April 4, 2011. The Solicitor General moved the Court for leave to participate in argument, and the Court granted the motion.

Tuesday, October 11, 2011

Cert Granted re Double Jeopardy



Double rainbow, double jeopardy. . . .


No 6th Cir opinions today. But the S Ct granted cert in Blueford v. Arkansas, No. 10-1320. The Ct's going to consider whether, if a jury is deadlocked on a lesser-included offense, double jeopardy bars reprosecution for a greater offense after a jury has announced that it has voted against guilt on that offense.


Stay tuned!

Thursday, July 14, 2011

GPS in SCOTUS

On June 27, 2011, the Supreme Court granted cert in United States v. Antoine Jones, No. 10--1259 (June 27, 2011). Decision below at 615 F.3d 544.

Question Presented:
Whether warrantless use of tracking device on defendant's vehicle to monitor the vehicle's movements on public street violated the Fourth Amendment.

Court also directed the parties to brief and argue the issue of whether the government violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by installing a GPS tracking device on the defendant's vehicle without a valid warrant and without the defendant's consent.