Red Dog

Federal criminal defense, blitzes and otherwise, in the Sixth Circuit and beyond.

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Showing posts with label Immigration. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Immigration. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 17, 2013

Detainers: A Brief Primer

In Ortega v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. 12-6608 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 2013) (for publication), the COA gives a short discussion of immigration detainers.  Thought it would be helpful to post.  Panel was Judges Keith, Sutton, and Black (S.D. Ohio).  Judge Keith dissented. 

The COA explained:

Immigration authorities focus on individuals accused of breaking other laws.  Using a database, authorities determine whether an individual convicted of a state or federal offense is in the country illegally.  If the agent determines that the person is here illegally, the agent will issue a detainer to the authority that is then holding the person.  This detainer requests that the latter authority keep the person in custody or let the immigration agency know when the person is about to be released. 

8 C.F.R. 287.7 regulates detainers. 

The COA admonishes that federal detainers do not normally raise constitutional questions:

"If a local prison keeps tabs on someone until his release, even if it moves him from one prison setting to another, it is difficult to see how that continued custody is any business of the Due Process Clause or for that matter the Fourth Amendment."  Likewise, the local prison may notify federal immigration authorities before an inmate's release to allow the authorities to take custody of the inmate to begin removal proceedings. 

As the COA points out, however, things get complicated in less straight-forward cases.  What if an arrest is based solely on the detainer?  What if a state refuses to release someone, because of an immigration detainer, who has posted bail?  What if a state keeps a person in custody, because of a detainer, when the sentence was weekend confinement?  Or the person is on home confinement and gets moved to a prison? 
 
 Once a person is convicted and sentenced, deprivation of liberty is permissible.  Deprivations caused by moving prisoners, and things like that, do not raise due-process concerns.  A shift from home confinement to prison, however, may implicate due-process concerns. 

Here, the plaintiff sued ICE b/c he was on home confinement, and an American citizen, and a detainer was erroneously issued, which caused authorities to incarcerate him for four days.  For both the due-process and Fourth Amendment claims, however, the COA just found that the law was unsettled and so qualified immunity protected the defendants. 

Judge Keith dissented.

Judge Keith believes there was a clearly established liberty interest in home confinement.  And officers should have known that removing a person from their home and incarcerating them requires a minimum level of process. 

"The facts of this case are such that the unlawfulness of Metro Defendants’ conduct is readily apparent, even in the absence of clarifying case law. Metro Defendants seized Ortega, an American-born, United States citizen, from his home and took him to jail for four days, based upon an improper detainer, without a warrant or any semblance of process. In doing so, Metro Defendants did not allow him to produce any documentation that he was an American citizen."

Dissent also sees a problem with the lack of the detainer in the record. Cannot assess the reasonableness of the officer's error without being able to review the detainer.  

"To allow ICE to issue a detainer against an American citizen, with unlimited discretion and without any accountability, sets a dangerous precedent and offends any and all notions of due process."



Tuesday, May 22, 2012

Great Crime-of-Violence and 2L1.2 Case

Kudos to one of our panel attorneys.  We now have United States v. Rede-Mendez, No. 10-2509 (6th Cir. May 21, 2012) (for publication).

Panel of Judges Moore, Griffin, and White.  Judge Griffin dissented.

Illegal-reentry case.  Below GLs sentence of 36 months (GLs were 57 to 71 months).  D had gotten the 16-level bump for a prior crime of violence.  He had a New Mexico aggravated assault (deadly weapon).  COA found this prior was not categorically a crime of violence, and the Shepard docs did not reveal the details of the conviction.  Case remanded for resentencing. 

To Note:
* The application notes to 2L1.2 give aggravated assault as a crime of violence. 
* Categorical approach applies.  And the name of a prior offense does not govern.  Just b/c it's called aggravated assault does not mean it is!  Must fall w/i generic definition. 
* COA looks to Model Penal Code for guidance.
* Reiterates need to "feign agnosticism" if Shepard docs don't reveal nature of prior offense.  "The likelihood that a defendant's conviction was based on a particular version of the offense is not a factor in the crime of violence analysis."  What matters is what the gov can show. 
* A statement of probable cause is NOT a Shepard document.

New Mexico Aggravated Assault:
* Includes using insulting language to impugn honor, delicacy, or reputation.  Even if a prosecution under this subsection might be rare, or even unconstitutional, it's still available to prosecutors. . . .
* Does not require specific intent to injure or frighten.
* A deadly weapon alone does not necessarily make it a crime of violence.

J. Griffin's Dissent:
* The 10th and 5th Circuits have held that New Mexico agg assault w/deadly weapon has as an element the use of force.  So they have found it to be a crime of violence. 
* Suggests that "common and legal sense" dictate that New Mexico courts do not recognize agg assault with a deadly weapon arising from insulting language.


Wednesday, December 28, 2011

Fast Track

OK, catching up a little. 

United States v. Sanchez-Duran, No. 10-5744 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2011) (unpublished).  Panel of Judges Guy, Kethledge, and White.

Was sentence procedurally unreasonable b/c the sentencing court did not recognize its authority to vary from the guidelines based on a belief that sentencing disparity created by fast-track programs is unwarranted?

The Court cites United States v. Camacho-Arellano, 614 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 2010).  The Camacho-Arellano court rejected the idea that district courts cannot grant variances based on disparities created by fast-track programs in other districts. 

Here, the defendant was sentenced after Kimbrough and Spears, but before Camacho-Arellano came out.  So the defendant argued remand was necessary b/c the district court did not recognize its discretion to consider the fast-track argument.

The Court concludes that it was not clear that the district court recognized its discretion to vary categorically from the guidelines based on fast-track disparities.  The district court's remarks could be read to suggest the court did not believe it had discretion b/c of prior 6th Cir. precedent. 

Camacho-Arellano discredits the argument that fast-track disparity "should not be disturbed because it reflect[s] congressional policy."  And the Court will not turn a blind eye to the context in which a district court's statements are made.  Even if the district court decision was ambiguous, the Court viewed it in light of the government's urging of an impermissible conclusion (that the court could not depart on the basis of fast-track disparity).

The record suggested that the district court did not believe it could vary based on unwarranted disparity created by fast-track sentencing in other districts.  The sentence was procedurally unreasonable and remand necessary.