GPS Tracking, Warrants, and Good Faith

OK, life has been moving along post-Jones. 

Things were good in the Third Circuit.

"The police acted in the face of unsettled law at a time when courts were becoming more attuned to the argument that warrantless GPS surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment. Excluding the evidence here will incentivize the police to err on the side of constitutional behavior and help prevent future Fourth Amendment violations. We therefore conclude that the police actions taken here do not qualify under the good faith exception and hold that the exclusionary rule should apply in this case."

United States v. Katzin, 732 F.3d 187, 214 (3d Cir. 2013).

So no good-faith exception to the warrant requirement. . . .

BUT

On December 12, 2013, the Third Circuit granted rehearing en banc.  Set for May 28, 2014.  I guess we'll just stay tuned.   

6th Cir Policy on e-Gadgets

The 6th Cir. has a new policy on electronic gear.  Released last month:

http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/court_calendars/documents/Electronic_Device.pdf

First Amendment, Social Media, Sex Offenders

Interesting case on sex offenders and social media. . . .

Doe v. Prosecutor, No. 12—2512 (7^th Cir. Jan. 23, 2013) (for publication).

Indiana statute prohibited sex offenders from using social media sites, instant messaging, and on-line chats.  John Doe challenged this statute on First Amendment grounds.  The Seventh Circuit found the law unconstitutional.  While it was content neutral, it was not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interests.  It broadly prohibited substantial protected speech instead of targeting improper communications to minors. 

Indiana Code section 35-42-4-12 prohibited certain sex offenders from knowingly using social-networking sites or instant-messaging or chat-room programs that the offender knows allow minors access or use. The statute did not differentiate sex offenders based on the age of the victim, the manner in which the crime was committed, or the time since the prior offense.  There was an exemption for people convicted of “Romeo and Juliet relationships,” those in which victim and perpetrator were close in age and had a consensual relationship.  The statute did not cover e-mail.

After a bench trial, the district court upheld the law, finding it narrowly tailored to serve a significant state interest.  There were other means of communication available. 

The Seventh Circuit found that the statute clearly implicated First Amendment rights: it precluded expression through social media, and it limited the right to receive information and ideas.  The law was content neutral---its restrictions did not turn on the content of the expression.  The state could “impose reasonable ‘time, place, or manner restrictions.’” 

To impose such restrictions, the law would have to meet “a variant of intermediate scrutiny.”  It had to be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and it had to leave open “ample alternative channels” allowing communication of the information.

The court found that the statute was not narrowly tailored, so it did not reach the alternative-channel inquiry. 

The statute targeted substantially more activity than the evil it sought to redress.  The district court had acknowledged this breadth, finding that the law captured conduct that had nothing to do with minors.  Indiana has other means to combat inappropriate communication between minors and sex offenders.

The court of appeals did not want to impose “too high a standard” on the state.  But in the end, “the Constitution tolerates some over-inclusiveness if it furthers the state's ability to administer the regulation and combat an evil,” but not as much as was presented here.   

There were other laws to address these concerns.  Indiana had statutes prohibiting solicitation.  The court of appeals observed that “[b]y breaking two laws, the sex offender will face increased sentences; however, the state can avoid First Amendment pitfalls by just increasing the sentences for solicitation—indeed, those laws already have enhanced penalties if the defendant uses a computer network.”

For our purposes, it is important to note that the court said, “this opinion should not be read to affect district courts’ latitude in fashioning terms of supervised release.”  It noted that “in assessing the need for incapacitation, see § 3553(a)(2)(C), a court could conceivably limit a defendant’s Internet access if full access posed too high a risk of recidivism.”  A total ban on the Internet could, however, be too broad.

SCOTUS to Consider Standing to Challenge Wiretapping

The S Ct granted cert in Clapper v. Amnesty International, No. 11-1025 (May 21, 2012). 

Question presented includes a little background:

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. 1881a (Supp. II 2008) (Section 1881a) allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to authorize jointly the targeting of "non-United States" persons "reasonably believed" to be outside the United States.  This targeting would be to acquire "foreign intelligence information," and would normally be with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's prior approval. 

The respondents in this case are "United States persons who may not be targeted for surveillance under Section 1881a."  They filed their action on the day Section 1881a was enacted, and have sought a declaration that Section 1881a is unconstitutional, and an injunction permanently enjoining any foreign-intelligence surveillance under Section 1881a.

The crux of the issue is whether the respondents lack Article III standing to seek prospective relief because they have proffered no evidence that the United States would imminently acquire any of their international communications using Section 1881a-authorized surveillance.  And they have not shown that an injunction prohibiting Section 1881a-authorized surveillance would likely redress the claimed injuries.

Second Circuit decision at: 638 F.3d 118.

If you like standing issues (and you know we get them once in a while!) and/or wiretapping and dragnet-surveillance issues, keep your eyes on this one!  Fourth Amendment issues undergird the whole thing. 

More Tech News: Searching Cell Phones

United States v. Flores-Lopez, No. 10-3803 (7th Cir. Feb. 29, 2012) (for publication).

Judges Bauer, Posner, and Rovner.

Seventh Circuit affirms district court's finding that cell-phone call history was admissible despite the fact that this history was obtained b/c the police searched the phone, without a warrant, to obtain the phone's number. 

This opinion is worth a read, especially on the heels of Jones and the GPS issue (see Jan. 25 post).

(I barely remember when phones looked like this one!)

A quick summary:

* Opening a diary found on a suspect whom the police have arrested, to verify the suspect's name and address and to discover whether the diary contains information relevant to the crime for which the suspect has been arrested, is permissible.  The cell-phone search is similar and "even less intrusive, since a cell phone’s phone number can be found without searching the phone’s contents."  

* This search did not touch on the use of an iCam to view the home of the owner of the seized cell phone.

* Other conspirators were involved in the drug distribution and they conceivably could have learned of the arrests (they could have been monitoring the drug deal from afar) and they could have wiped the cell phone remotely before the government could obtain and execute a warrant and conduct a search pursuant to the warrant to find the cell phone’s number.

* It is conceivable that the defendant might have had time to warn co-conspirators before the cell phone was taken from him, allowing time to wipe the phone.  While "conceivably” does not mean “probably,” the set off against the modest benefit to police of being able to obtain the cell phone’s phone number immediately comes at "only a modest cost in invasion of privacy."

* Armed with the phone number, the officers could obtain the call history at their leisure.  And if the number was lawfully obtained, subpoenaing the call history from the phone company would also be lawful.  A history thus obtained could properly be used in evidence against a defendant.

* It is "imperative" that officers have the authority to search or retrieve immediately, incident to a valid arrest, information from pagers in order to prevent destruction of evidence.  Same holds here.

* The court could "certainly imagine justifications for a more extensive search."  But the court leaves these questions for another day, as police here only obtained the phone’s number.

Really Exciting News from the 11th Cir. re Encrypted Files

In Re: Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011: United States v. Doe, Nos. 11-12268 & 11-15421 (11th Cir. Feb. 23, 2012) (published).

Panel of Judges Tjoflat, Martin, and Hill.

CP case. 

Appeal of a civil contempt order.  D got subpoena to appear before grand jury and produce unencrypted contents of hard drives.  D told US Attorney that he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to comply with the subpoena.  US Attorney asked the district court for an order granting D immunity and requiring him to respond to the subpoena. 

The immunity would extend only to D's production of the unencrypted contents---not the gov's derivative use of the contents.  The district court issued the order.  D appeared before the grand jury and refused to decrypt the hard drives.  D invoked his Fifth Amendment rights (D was w/o counsel at these times).  D also claimed he could not decrypt the material.  The district court adjudged the D in contempt and incarcerated him. 

Authorities had gotten the hard drives after investigating CP allegations and tracing them back to the D and a hotel room in California.  Law enforcement got a warrant and seized all digital media and a number of encryption devices/codes to access the media.  Forensic examiners, however, were unable to view some of the material, which led to the proceedings at issue. 

D feared that his decryption of the materials would show he, and not another person, had placed the materials on the digital media and encrypted the materials. 

Conclusions:
* D's decryption and production of the hard drives' contents would trigger Fifth Amendment protection b/c it would be testimonial; such protection would extend to the gov's use of the materials. 
* Material that is a link in the chain that leads to incriminating evidence is enough to invoke the Fifth Amendment. 
* The files themselves are not testimonial.  But the actual contents of the drives were not the issue.  The issue was the act of production when that production explicitly or implicitly conveyed a statement of fact. 
* "Foregone conclusion" doctrine: the existence and location of papers are foregone conclusions, so the possessor of the documents adds little by conceding that he/she has the papers.  Not testimony then---just surrender---so no constitutional rights involved.  This doctrine does not apply when the gov does not know of the existence of documents beyond suspicion. 
* Test: "whether the government compels the individual to use 'the contents of his own mind' to explicitly or implicitly communicate some statement of fact." 
* An act of production is not testimonial if 1) the gov merely compels some physical act (no use of the mind), or 2) if the "foregone conclusion" doctrine applies b/c the gov "can show with 'reasonable particularity' that, at the time it sought to compel the act of production, it already knew of the materials." 
* Ct held that the act of decryption and production of the contents of the hard drives would implicate the Fifth Amendment.  The act would be testimonial---not merely physical and the factual communications associated with the decryption/production were not foregone conclusions. 
* Decryption requires use of the mind: tantamount to testimony that D knew of the materials, possessed/accessed them, and could decrypt them. 
* No "foregone conclusion" here b/c gov could not show it knew whether any files actually existed or the location of such files.  Gov could not even show it knew D could access the encrypted portions of the drives. 
* Encryption alone does not mean a person is trying to hide something. 
* Immunity granted here insufficient.  "Use and derivative-use immunity establishes the critical threshold to overcome an individual's invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination."  Gov did not give such immunity here.  So D could not be compelled to decrypt the drives. 
* D "properly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege."  His refusal to decrypt the hard drives w/o sufficient immunity was justified.  District ct erred in adjudging him in civil contempt.  Dist ct's judgment reversed.