Red Dog

Federal criminal defense, blitzes and otherwise, in the Sixth Circuit and beyond.

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Showing posts with label Supervised Release Violations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Supervised Release Violations. Show all posts

Friday, February 1, 2013

First Amendment, Social Media, Sex Offenders


Interesting case on sex offenders and social media. . . .

Doe v. Prosecutor, No. 12—2512 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, 2013) (for publication).

Indiana statute prohibited sex offenders from using social media sites, instant messaging, and on-line chats.  John Doe challenged this statute on First Amendment grounds.  The Seventh Circuit found the law unconstitutional.  While it was content neutral, it was not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interests.  It broadly prohibited substantial protected speech instead of targeting improper communications to minors. 

Indiana Code section 35-42-4-12 prohibited certain sex offenders from knowingly using social-networking sites or instant-messaging or chat-room programs that the offender knows allow minors access or use. The statute did not differentiate sex offenders based on the age of the victim, the manner in which the crime was committed, or the time since the prior offense.  There was an exemption for people convicted of “Romeo and Juliet relationships,” those in which victim and perpetrator were close in age and had a consensual relationship.  The statute did not cover e-mail.

After a bench trial, the district court upheld the law, finding it narrowly tailored to serve a significant state interest.  There were other means of communication available. 

The Seventh Circuit found that the statute clearly implicated First Amendment rights: it precluded expression through social media, and it limited the right to receive information and ideas.  The law was content neutral---its restrictions did not turn on the content of the expression.  The state could “impose reasonable ‘time, place, or manner restrictions.’” 

To impose such restrictions, the law would have to meet “a variant of intermediate scrutiny.”  It had to be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and it had to leave open “ample alternative channels” allowing communication of the information.

The court found that the statute was not narrowly tailored, so it did not reach the alternative-channel inquiry. 

The statute targeted substantially more activity than the evil it sought to redress.  The district court had acknowledged this breadth, finding that the law captured conduct that had nothing to do with minors.  Indiana has other means to combat inappropriate communication between minors and sex offenders.

The court of appeals did not want to impose “too high a standard” on the state.  But in the end, “the Constitution tolerates some over-inclusiveness if it furthers the state's ability to administer the regulation and combat an evil,” but not as much as was presented here.   

There were other laws to address these concerns.  Indiana had statutes prohibiting solicitation.  The court of appeals observed that “[b]y breaking two laws, the sex offender will face increased sentences; however, the state can avoid First Amendment pitfalls by just increasing the sentences for solicitation—indeed, those laws already have enhanced penalties if the defendant uses a computer network.”

For our purposes, it is important to note that the court said, “this opinion should not be read to affect district courts’ latitude in fashioning terms of supervised release.”  It noted that “in assessing the need for incapacitation, see § 3553(a)(2)(C), a court could conceivably limit a defendant’s Internet access if full access posed too high a risk of recidivism.”  A total ban on the Internet could, however, be too broad.

Friday, January 20, 2012

Tapia and Supervised Release

Supreme Court granted cert, vacated, and remanded to the Fifth Circuit in Breland v. United States, No. 11-6912 (Jan. 17, 2012). 

Gov conceded that Tapia applies in supervised-release context.  Can't lengthen prison time for purposes of rehab.

Monday, October 17, 2011

Concurrent vs. Consecutive Sentences for SRVs



United States v. Stevenson, No. 10-6510 (6th Cir. Oct. 13, 2011) (unpublished). Panel of Judges Moore, Griffin, and White.



Defendant appealed 24-month consecutive sentence for supervised-release violation. Argued sentence was procedurally unreasonable b/c ct failed to appreciate that it had the discretion to impose a concurrent sentence.

COA remanded for resentencing.



GL range for violations was 21 to 27 months. Sentencing ct imposed a 24-month sentence to be served consecutively to any state term defendant was serving.



COA found that the dist ct had attempted to address all of the defendant's arguments, so the sentence was not procedurally unreasonable b/c of a failure to consider the arguments.



Defendant argued that the dist ct wrongly concluded that the Bureau of Prisons would not honor a recommendation that the SR sentence and the undischarged state sentence be concurrent. Defendant argued that the dist ct did not mention or consider 5G1.3(c) (addressing concurrent and consecutive sentences and factors to consider).



COA considered 5G1.3(c) and 7B1.3(f) (which provides for consecutive sentences in the SRV context). Citing its recent decision in United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195 (6th Cir. 2011), the appellate court reiterated that 7B1.3(f) does not strip a district court of the discretion to impose a concurrent sentence for a supervised-release violation. In this case, the Sixth Circuit found that "Unlike in Johnson, it is not clear from the district court's remarks whether it understood it had discretion to impose a concurrent sentence." So COA remanded.