Red Dog

Federal criminal defense, blitzes and otherwise, in the Sixth Circuit and beyond.

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Showing posts with label Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Show all posts

Monday, February 11, 2013

Terry Stops: 6th Cir. Provides New Guidance

Another snow picture!



United States v. Young, No. 11--2296 (6th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (designated for publication on Feb. 7, 2013).

Panel of Judges Siler, Cook, and Steeh (E.D. Mich).

Felon-in-possession case.

Procedural wrinkle:
* Defendant moved the district court to suppress evidence in 2007 during his original case.  He appealed that court's denial of the motion.  The COA affirmed b/c the defendant had not preserved the issue properly. 
* The defendant then filed a 2255 based on counsel's failure to preserve the issue.
* The district court vacated the original plea and accepted an amended conditional plea that preserved the issue.
* This appeal then followed.

Facts:
* On December 15, 2006, at 1:15 a.m., the defendant was sitting in the passenger seat of a car, in a reclined position, in a city-owned parking lot outside Julian's Bar and Restaurant in Grand Rapids, MI.  It was a lot regularly used by Julian's patrons. 
* Area had a recent history of violent crime, including shootings and assaults.
* Police officers testified that those waiting outside Julian's are more likely to be armed, as Julian's conducts pat-downs.
* Officers also testified that they look for those loitering, as loitering leads to "problems." 
* Under the city's loitering and trespassing ordinances, it was a crime to be in the lot without business at the adjacent establishments.
* Officers pulled into the lot.  They parked behind the defendant.  They observed the defendant for about a minute and a half.
* The officers approached the car in which the defendant was sitting.  They looked through the windows with flashlights.  One officer hit the passenger window with a flashlight.  After a fifteen-second pause, the defendant rolled down the window.  The officer requested ID.  When asked if he was "chillin'," the defendant replied that he'd fallen asleep while his companion ran into Julian's to see if they could get a table, or if they should just get take out. 
* The friend returned to the vehicle at that point.
* Officers sent the friend back into Julian's and told the defendant to "sit tight."
* The officers collected the defendant's ID and ran a warrant check.
* The defendant allegedly began making gestures around his pocket, as though he had contraband.  An officer asked the defendant to step out of the car.  The defendant then disclosed that he had a gun.  The defendant was cuffed, an officer reported an outstanding warrant, and the entire incident lasted about four minutes.

Conclusions and reasoning:
* The defendant was subject to a Terry stop when the police car parked behind the vehicle in which he sat.
* COA cited United States v. See, 574 F.3d 309 (6th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2011).  Even though the stop here occurred before these cases were decided, this case was pending on direct review after those decisions. 
* At the time the police cruiser parked behind the defendant, the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant: it was a high-crime area, Julian's pats its patrons down, and the defendant was reclined in the car. 
* The high-crime area and pat-downs are contextual factors entitled to little weight, but they are still relevant.  The COA recognized that the crime in the area was violent crime, as opposed to the trespassing the police suspected the defendant was engaged in, but officers testified that trespassing and guns "are inter-related."  The pat-downs at Julian's meant ppl with guns were more likely to wait outside.   
* The COA gave reclining in a car at 1:15 a.m. more weight.  Officers believed the defendant was trespassing. 
* The COA rejected the defendant's "novel argument that suspicion of a mere trespassing violation is not sufficient to support a Terry stop under a 'reasonableness' inquiry because such offenses do not pose a danger to the public." 
* The warrant check and initial questioning were permissible under Terry.  While the permissibility of the warrant check was undecided prior to this case, the COA concluded that the check was permissible.  Other circuits had so held. 
* The warrant check would have produced the outstanding warrant regardless, so the officers could have arrested the defendant, and would have discovered the gun. 
* The stop, the COA noted, lasted only four minutes.  It was reasonable to tell the defendant to "sit tight." 
* COA recognized the potential for Terry-stop abuse, but decided that police must be able to investigate actual crimes, even if the crime is just trespassing. 
 

 
 

Tuesday, July 3, 2012

FSA Getting Fleshed Out

United States v. Finley, No. 10-3672 (6th Cir. June 29, 2012) (unpublished).

Panel of Judges McKeague, White, and Barrett (S.D. Ohio).

OK, so we got Dorsey on June 21: the FSA applies to defendants sentenced after the FSA went into effect, even if the offense occurred pre-FSA. 

Well, the Sixth Cir. just concluded that the FSA does not apply to people sentenced pre-FSA, even if their cases were on appeal when the FSA went into effect.  The COA rejected a Dorsey argument. 

Mandatory life on the table in Finley.  Jury found D guilty.  GL range of 151 to 188 months, but statute trumped and D got life in prison.  Mandatory minimum under the FSA would have been ten years (248 grams of crack + prior convictions).

COA looked to 1 U.S.C. 109 and Carradine.  Also looked to other circuits.  Cabined Dorsey to post-FSA sentencings.  COA rejected policy arguments.  Court also rejected argument about the case being on direct review: precedent on this issue applies only to S Ct decisions that come out---not to statutes. 

(The other issue was ineffective assistance of counsel.  While the defendant "raises serious questions about the competence of his defense counsel," ineffective-assistance claim not for direct appeal---needs to be in 2255.) 

COA affirmed.

Enjoy the 4th!

Thursday, May 24, 2012

Lafler Playing Out: IAC

So here we go: we're starting to see ineffective-assistance cases fleshing out Lafler.

Titlow v. Burt, No. 10-2488 (6th Cir. May 22, 2012) (for publication).

Have a great Memorial Day weekend, everyone!

Chief Judge Batchelder, Judges Clay and Gilman.

Chief Judge Batchelder dissented. 

State prisoner appealed dist ct's denial of her habeas petition.  She was convicted of second-degree murder.  COA reversed.  Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim arising out of plea-bargaining process had merit.  Inmate's second attorney was ineffective b/c he failed to investigate case before recommending that the inmate withdraw her plea.  Under plea, inmate would have received a 7-to15-year sentence.  After being convicted by a jury, the inmate received a 20-to-40-year sentence.  COA conditionally granted the habeas petition and gave the state 90 days to reoffer the original plea or to release the inmate.

Plea:
* Inmate was represented by an attorney who negotiated a plea deal.  Charges reduced to manslaughter, 7-to-15-year sentence.  Defendant to submit to a poly and testify against co-defendant.  Defendant would not challenge the prosecutor's recommended sentencing range on appeal. 
* Defendant pleaded guilty.
* After plea, the defendant spoke with a sheriff's deputy at the local jail.  This fellow advised the defendant not to plead guilty if she believed she was innocent.  He referred the defendant to another attorney.  This attorney agreed to represent the defendant in exchange for jewelry and media rights. 
* Defendant withdrew her plea.  Based on defendant declining to testify against the co-defendant.

Post-Plea Proceedings:
* The new attorney did not obtain the file, inspect the state's discovery materials, or speak with the prior attorney for a month and a half after the withdrawal of the plea. 
* After obtaining the file, the attorney moved to withdraw.  Claimed lack of $$$ from client. 
* State court appointed a third attorney.
* Jury convicted the defendant and she got 20 to 40 years of custody.  Co-defendant was acquitted. 
* Mich Ct App affirmed sentence on direct appeal and rejected all constitutional challenges.  Mich S Ct denied leave to appeal.  Motion for relief from judgment denied.  Mich Ct App denied leave to appeal that decision. 

Habeas Review:
* The inmate sought fed habeas review.  Dist ct denied, but granted certificate of appealability.

COA Conclusions:
* While decision to plead guilty rests with client, attorney has duty to inform client of options.  Attorney must reasonably investigate case.  Defendants have the right to expect counsel to review their cases and explain the elements, evidence, and sentencing exposure.   
* As Lafler has told us, "the simple fact of a higher sentence after trial is sufficient to demonstrate prejudice" for an IAC claim. 
* Substantial disparity b/t plea offer and post-trial sentence provides evidence that a defendant would have accepted a plea deal. 
* COA recognizes that "defendants may have legitimate reasons for continuing to maintain their innocence during and even after plea negotiations." 
* No need for a defendant to support with objective evidence an assertion that they would have accepted a plea offer.
* No evidence that the second attorney explained the elements of the charges, explained the defendant's sentencing exposure, or discussed the evidence.  Attorney failed in his obligations. 
* Not sound professional judgment or strategic choice.
* Inmate can show the court would have accepted the plea and the sentence would have been less.  The court accepted the plea the first time around.  Sentence the inmate got was substantially higher than the one available under the plea. 

Remedy:
* Lafler kind of leaves this door open. . . .
* Problem here is the plea deal was based in part on the inmate's agreement to cooperate against the co-defendant.  Co-defendant was acquitted and then died, so that basis for the plea deal is now gone.
* State should reoffer the plea.  State trial court would then have discretion to vacate the trial conviction and accept the plea or leave the conviction undisturbed.  State court should recognize the plea deal as a "baseline" to consult in fashioning an appropriate remedy.
* But COA acknowledges there may be a problem if the state court just reimposes the last sentence.  But Lafler says the state court must at least consult the initital plea agreement in crafting a new sentence.  Ct's discretion is not unfettered.  If there's a problem (eg, new sentence is greater than origianl plea deal), the later remedy in fed ct is a question for another day. 

Chief Judge Batchelder's dissent:
* Mich Ct App's denial of IAC claim was reasonable. 
* It was not counsel's advice that motivated the defendant to withdraw her plea.  And even if counsel encouraged the withdrawal, such advice did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
* Counsel represented the inmate for only three days before the plea withdrawal.  No time to review case file. 
* Lafler distinguishable b/c that petitioner "presented actual evidence that he received deficient advice." 
* Lafler does not require the trial ct to consult the original plea agreement.  Lafler "simply says that the 'baseline' of the original plea offer 'can be consulted in finding a remedy.'"
* Lafler does not require resentencing. 

Monday, February 27, 2012

Two CP Decisions. . . .

United States v. Ferguson, No. 10-3070 (6th Cir. Feb. 27, 2012) (published).

Panel of Judges Kennedy, Gibbons, and Kethledge.

CP case.  D appealed the special conditions of his supervised release.  Also appealed denial of suppression motion, and claimed ineffective assistance of counsel (counsel's failure to preserve suppression issue for appeal). 

D had been residing in a residence that was in disrepair (he did not have a property interest in it and only stayed there part-time).  Police told of possible CP (contacted by another police department).  Police went to the residence and arrested the D for trespassing.  Searched home (to ensure no other trespassers present).  Seized D's property; said home scheduled for demolition and evidence could be destroyed.  Detective got a warrant and examined the electronic media.  Found CP. 

The district court denied D's motion to suppress: D did not own the home, had no lawful possession of it, had been convicted of failing to keep it sanitary, and had been ordered to stay away from it.  Home was scheduled for demolition. 

D pleaded guilty.  Appellate waiver in plea agreement.  Agreement detailed several conditions the government would seek for supervised release.   

District court imposed a sentence of 30 months and 10 years of supervised release.  Among the conditions of supervised release were: 1) ban on contact with minors; 2) ban on contact with people with sexual interests in minors; 3) no jobs/residence/recreation and such involving minors; 4) ban on loitering within 100' of a school/playground frequented by minors; and 5) no on-line access w/o probation's approval. 

Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, based on failing to preserve right to appeal suppression issue, should wait for a 2255.  Record not developed on direct appeal.  Unconditional plea means no review of the denial of the motion to suppress here.  As to the conditions of supervised release, the D waived his right to appeal them.  Even a lack of notice of one of the conditions did not jump the waiver hurdle.  A general reservation of the right to appeal a punishment in excess of the statutory max does not preserve the right to challenge SR conditions. 

*****

Next there is United States v. Robinson, No. 09-1959 (6th Cir. Feb. 27, 2012) (published).

Panel of Judges Cole, Rogers, and Sargus (S.D. Ohio). 

CP case.  GLs of 78 to 97 months.  District court gave the D one day in custody and 5 years of SR.  Sentence vacated as substantively unreasonable. 

Psych report indicated that the D was a low risk for recidivism (and other positive factors).  D was cooperative, lacked criminal history, went to counseling, and had a painful back condition. 

The government appealed the one-day sentence.  The court of appeals looked at Gall and cited a portion about ensuring that justifications for a variance are sufficient to support the degree of the variance.  The appellate court found that courts struggle with CP cases and cited a Sentencing Commission statistic that variances occur in 60% of the cases. 

The sentence was procedurally reasonable, but failed substantively.  Sentence based excessively on the issue of recidivism (low risk for hands-on offenses); this case was about CP---not child molestation.  D's employment history, age, and debilitating back condition were "discouraged" factors under the GLs.  Even post-Booker, a sentencing court "should take into account 'the 'discouraged' status of these factors.'"  The other 3553(a) factors received too little attention from the district court.

The court of appeals cited Bistline, that CP case we included in a post on January 14, 2012.  The COA recognized that the CP GLs are controversial "and are currently under review by the Sentencing Commission."  Court acknowledged that "In the computer age, we have some doubt that the number of pictures alone captures the gravity of the crime of possession of child pornography."  But this D collected his images over an extended period of time and paid to do so. 

The court of appeals distinguished United States v. Stall, 581 F.3d 276 (6th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Prisel, 316 F. App`x 377 (6th Cir. 2008), both of which involved one-day sentences and involved plain-error review. 

"[E]xtraordinary circumstances may justify extraordinary variances or departures."  This finding seems to follow up on some of the problematic issues in Bistline. 


Wednesday, February 22, 2012

Good Reminder re Notices of Appeal

Sorry for the long break in posts.  Trial. . . .

Today, the Circuit gives us a good reminder to stay on top of those notices of appeal (NOA).  Jackson v. Chandler, No. 10-6060 (6th Cir. Feb. 21, 2012) (unpublished).  (It's still listed on "today's opinions.")

Judges Merritt, Cook, and Cox (E.D. Mich.).  Per curiam. 

Habeas action from state court.  Petitioner filed his 2254 in 2008, challenging his 2002 murder conviction.  The district court dismissed the petition as untimely.  Also found that counsel's error in calculating the timeliness of the petition did not call for equitable tolling.  The district court entered its judgment on March 26, 2010.  Deadline to file notice of appeal was April 26, 2010.  Not filed till April 29, 2010.  Court of appeals dismissed as untimely.  While the appeal was pending, the petitioner moved the district court for an extension of time in which to file the appeal. 

Counsel claimed she forgot to tell her assistant to overnight the NOA.  So it allegedly got to the court a day late.  In reality, however, the NOA was three days late.  Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(c) does not give the three extra days for NOAs.  Court cites Ultimate Appliance CC v. Kirby Co., 601 F.3d 414, 416 (6th Cir. 2010).

The district court denied the motion, finding that counsel's oversight did not constitute excusable neglect.  The petitioner appealed. 

Under 28 U.S.C. 2107(c), district courts have only limited authority to extend the time limits for filing an NOA.  A district court may extend for excusable neglect or good cause if the motion is filed within thirty days of the expiration of the prescribed time.  Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) governs.  Findings of excusable neglect are "extraordinary."  And clients are held accountable for their attorneys' actions/omissions.  Attorney inadvertence usually does not meet the standard for excusable neglect.  Being busy is not excusable neglect.     

The court of appeals affirmed.

Remember, Sixth Circuit Rule 101(a) says trial counsel in criminal cases must continue to represent a client on appeal until the Circuit explicitly relieves the attorney.  We're on the case till we're off!  And the Court reminds us here that there's no excuse for filing NOAs late!

Friday, October 14, 2011

More SCOTUS

Another case to watch is from the 6th Cir. with argument set for Halloween.

Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209.

Decision for 6th Cir. is 376 F. App`x 563.

Defendant charged with assault with intent to commit murder. Counsel advised him to reject plea offer b/c of a misunderstanding of Michigan law. Defendant rejected the offer. He was convicted as charged. (No trial error asserted.)

On habeas review, the 6th Cir. found that there was a reasonable probability that the defendant would have accepted the plea offer had he been properly advised. So his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. The writ was conditioned on the state once again offering the plea deal.

Questions presented are:

Whether a state habeas petitioner is entitled to relief when counsel deficiently advised him to reject a favorable plea deal, and defendant is later convicted after a fair trial.

What remedy, if any, should be provided for ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations if a defendant is later convicted under constitutionally adequate procedures?